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ABSTRACT 
 
THE NEOLIBERAL CITY AND THE NEIGHBORHOOD: 
THE CASE OF THE LINDSAY HEIGHTS REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT 
 
 
by 
 
 
Rodney Ranken 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2013 
Under the Supervision of Professor Anne Bonds 
 
 
A 1994 Fannie Mae report on poverty in America identified 20 census tracts in 
the city of Milwaukee that had the third fastest rate of growth in poverty in the nation, 
behind only areas in Detroit and Los Angeles. This prompted The Wisconsin Housing 
and Economic Development Authority (WHEDA) to initiate a redevelopment program 
that came to be known as Lindsay Heights. This study will ascertain what the impetus 
was for the Lindsay Heights Redevelopment Project and analyze the role that neoliberal 
governance played in its implementation. I will also examine how ideas of nostalgia and 
branding of the neighborhood played a role in this process. This study will also, through 
quantitative analysis, ascertain whether the project has achieved its stated goals and, 
through the use of MPROP block level data, evaluate how the project has affected the 
community.  
The Lindsay Heights project seems to have had some measurable success in 
attaining its goals. Property values went up disproportionately when compared to the city 
of Milwaukee as a whole; the tax base increased; and over 160 vacant sites were filled. 
By introducing new construction to neighborhoods whose existing housing stock was 
  iv 
built mostly around the turn of the last century, developers virtually guaranteed that the 
neighborhoods where these new homes were built would be mixed-income, due to the 
drastic differences in home value between new and existing homes. In addition, the 
installation of new homes in the project area has increased owner-occupancy rates and 
had the effect of increasing the value of existing homes. 
This study shows how the redevelopment of Milwaukee’s Lindsay Heights 
neighborhood is the result of a particular form of neoliberalism that manifests itself 
through slightly nuanced neoliberal processes such as quasi-public-private partnerships, 
as well as specific branding of the city—and the Lindsay Heights neighborhood—that 
embraces working class values and New Urbanist development philosophies. The 
branding of the city as a “genuine American city” and the promotion of New Urbanist 
ideology allowed city leaders to trade on Milwaukee’s working class heritage to create a 
sense of place that promoted hard work and perseverance over government handouts. It is 
clear that the Lindsay Heights project has been successful in achieving many of its goals 
while working within the framework of traditional neoliberalism; however, it is not clear 
that the project addressed the core issues, such as poverty, that caused the initial decline 
of the neighborhood. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
In 1994 Fannie Mae produced a report on poverty in America that identified 20 
census tracts in the city of Milwaukee that had the third fastest rate of growth in poverty 
in the nation, behind only areas in Detroit and Los Angeles (WHEDA 2009, Former 
WHEDA staff member interview 2011). This caught the attention of The Wisconsin 
Housing and Economic Development Authority (WHEDA), an organization that 
facilitates the financing of affordable housing and economic development initiatives in 
Wisconsin (WHEDA 2009). What alarmed WHEDA was the proximity of these 
impoverished census tracts to the downtown area, which was undergoing considerable 
redevelopment at the time. WHEDA was concerned with the implications this might have 
for their mortgage portfolio in the Milwaukee area. One WHEDA employee compared it 
to an apple with a rotten spot on it: “If you don’t do something about it, what will happen 
to the rest of the apple?” (Former WHEDA staff member interview 2011). This sparked 
the beginning of the Lindsay Heights redevelopment initiative, which involved the 
construction of 165 houses and the renovation of 230 more over a 20 year period 
beginning in 1995 and continuing through the present, although little has been done in the 
study area since the housing bubble collapsed. 
Begun in 1995, The Lindsay Heights redevelopment project has been hailed by 
local officials as a very successful example of the ways public-private partnerships can be 
instrumental in the redevelopment and redefinition of troubled inner-city neighborhoods 
(Figure 1-1). Described as such, it sounds like a model of the benefits of neoliberal 
policies, and in certain ways it is. However, a close examination of the larger history and 
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make-up of the Lindsay Heights area suggests potentially positive and negative 
influences of neoliberal policies and practices. 
Figure 1-1: Location of Lindsay Heights Redevelopment Project (Source: Google Maps)
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Despite the frequent reference to neoliberalism in social science literature, arguably, 
an insufficient amount of attention has been paid to its influence on governance at the 
scale of the neighborhood (but see Martin 2003, Elwood 2004; Ghose 2005). Given the 
success claimed for it, the Lindsay Heights project offers an interesting case study to 
examine in depth. Rather than focusing on residents of the neighborhood and their 
participation/investment in this project, I should note that this particular evaluation 
focuses on the articulation of urban problems and solutions offered by city and quasi-
state officials.  By documenting the history of the case study area and tracing the origins, 
strategies, execution, and effects of the redevelopment project, we can better understand 
the role that neoliberalism and related ideologies have played in the construction of the 
landscape of Milwaukee, and we can highlight the ways in which local governance 
differs in shaping contemporary responses to urban problems.  At the same time, we can 
identify avenues that may be exploited by other cities or organizations seeking to 
transform similar neighborhoods. Thus, this case study offers us theoretical insight on 
and a practical evaluation of neoliberal-inspired strategies. 
 
Public Policy and the Neighborhood: Political Economic Shifts 
The urban landscape in the United States has been produced and reproduced 
through various processes and policies. Perhaps the two most pervasive institutions to 
shape the urban landscape in the United States are capitalism and the federal government. 
There is little doubt that capitalism has played an extremely important role in the ways 
urban landscapes develop and transform over time. David Harvey argues that the built 
environment of the city is a manifestation of the disinvestment of capital from certain 
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areas of the city, coupled with the reinvestment of capital in infrastructure in other parts 
of the city, especially during periods of over-accumulation. This investment in 
infrastructure leads to the reproduction of the labor force and provides avenues for future 
investment in that favored area (Harvey 2010). As these investments become less 
profitable they become devalued. The devalued parts of the infrastructure simply 
languish.  
In a broad sense, the built environment that is Lindsay Heights was an early 
victim of this process. The political economy that constitutes the Keynesian approach to 
capitalism varies a great deal from the neoliberal approach that is prevalent today. The 
Keynesian approach viewed government as a key actor in the production of civil society. 
It attempted to provide services to disadvantaged members of society through a social 
safety net and other government-funded services. The neoliberal approach seeks to 
drastically reduce government funding for these types of services, preferring to let 
markets determine the fate of society. Neoliberalism often fails to acknowledge that the 
pull-yourself-up-by-your-bootstraps ideal of personal responsibility may be more difficult 
for people from areas that have seen a disproportionate disinvestment in infrastructure 
and education. 
Kenneth Jackson’s study of federal housing policy from the Depression era, 
highlighting the rise of the suburbs in contrast to central city neighborhoods, identifies 
the impact of Keynesian policies on the uneven development of housing markets 
(Jackson 1985). Historically, the United States government has been a strong proponent 
of land ownership. Unfortunately, many of the policies implemented by the U.S. 
government have been unfair and inequitable to minorities and the lower class. The 
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National Housing Act of 1934 fundamentally changed the criteria by which home loans 
were issued by providing federal insurance for long-term home loans. It was the goal of 
the government to boost the housing market by allowing banks to circulate more capital 
in the form of home loans. This approach was intended to make home ownership more 
accessible to more people—who would then spur real estate development, thereby 
creating jobs which would benefit the economy and the financial institutions who issued 
the loans. Jackson argues that these policies resulted in a prejudice against older 
construction, preferential treatment to upper middle class whites, and widespread 
suburbanization (1985). These practices were first implemented by the Home Owners 
Loan Corporation (HOLC) and later enforced by the Federal Housing Authority (FHA). 
The most notorious of these practices was redlining, the process by which HOLC 
employees established the location of residences whose mortgages would not be insured 
by the federal government. This resulted in the concentration of poverty in older urban 
areas, ethnic segregation and homogenization, and the rapid decay of inner-city 
neighborhoods (Jackson, 1985). 
Like many post-industrial cities, Milwaukee has had to deal with urban flight, 
segregation, and a fiscal squeeze due to the loss of tax base (Schmidt 2008). For many 
years Milwaukee, like other metropolitan areas, has been expanding at the periphery as 
older, city neighborhoods decline. The automobile, government programs, and a shift in 
planning strategies have all contributed to suburbanization across the United States 
(Jackson 1985). Milwaukee, however, has also experienced a massive decline in its 
manufacturing base over the last 35 years. The loss of these jobs has affected central city 
residents and minorities disproportionately (Schmidt 2008). The effects of this job loss on 
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central city architecture have been profound. Housing fell into disrepair. Owner-occupied 
structures turned into rentals, whose condition also deteriorated. Houses were abandoned 
or condemned, and eventually demolished by the city. Many structures were lost to urban 
renewal and freeway construction. As these neighborhoods declined, they experienced a 
cycle of disinvestment, not just in the housing stock of the neighborhood, but also in 
commercial ventures and city services (Jackson 1985). In short, the deterioration of 
housing and neighborhoods resulted in lower property values, decreased tax revenues, 
reduced interest in investment, and an erosion of the social fabric (Kaplan et al 2005). 
The challenge that has faced Milwaukee from the 1950s to the present is how to reverse 
this cycle of disinvestment and revitalize inner city neighborhoods.  
During the period that suburbanization and deindustrialization began to challenge 
the older, working-class neighborhoods of Milwaukee, policies at the national-level also 
began to shift away from Keynesian influenced urban policies. As will be explained in 
the next chapter, from Nixon’s declaration that “we’re all Keynesians now” to Jimmy 
Carter’s administration, the role of government began a transformation. With regard to 
housing there has been a significant shift from the Keynesian approach to the market-
driven approach of neoliberalism. While much still needs to be considered regarding the 
influence of neoliberal policies on housing in particular locations, there are some 
generalizations that apply. Some notable differences between Keynesian and neoliberal 
approaches involve the devolution of the responsibility for affordable housing from the 
federal government to state and local levels, the dismantling of public housing through 
Section 8 and other programs that transfer housing to the private sector, and an emphasis 
on non-profit organizations’ provision of affordable housing. 
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Research Questions and the Case Study 
As noted earlier, neoliberal policies and practices have been studied fairly widely, 
yet they have not been as widely or successfully studied at the scale of the neighborhood. 
Given that one prominent feature of neoliberalism is its emphasis on localism or the idea 
that each area is unique and should be allowed to forge its own policies, more small-scale 
studies of neoliberal policies seem particularly important. This case study was undertaken 
to establish what the impetus was for the redevelopment project was, to ascertain what 
the role of neoliberal governance played in its implementation, and attempt to understand 
how nostalgia and branding of the neighborhood impacted the project. Statistical analysis 
will also be utilized to evaluate the impact of the project and claims of its success. 
The area of Milwaukee that is known as Lindsay Heights is an excellent choice 
for such study because it has seen the worst effects of many of the processes mentioned 
above. It was the victim of many of the policies that resulted in the hollowing out of 
central city neighborhoods. The age and condition of the housing stock and the ethnic 
make-up of the neighborhood coincide rather well with Jackson’s description of the end 
result of government housing policies. Historically, Lindsay Heights fits all the criteria 
that would result in the FHA redlining the neighborhood. There is also little doubt that 
Lindsay Heights, like much of Milwaukee, has been damaged by deindustrialization, the 
loss of capital investment, and by government initiatives such as highway construction 
that divided traditional communities. 
Furthermore, what makes the Lindsay Heights Redevelopment Project worth 
studying is that many claim a measure of success for it despite all of this, and despite the 
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fact that it lacks the typical attractive features—proximity to waterfront or to 
downtown—that have helped other urban redevelopment initiatives to succeed. The 
Lindsay Heights project has also succeeded, at least by some measures, in the elusive 
goal of mixed-income residents. The fact that Lindsay Heights met these goals through a 
process described in neo-liberal terms provides a rare opportunity to study the narrative 
underpinning neoliberal governance practices as well as the practical measures of success 
for this particular neighborhood redevelopment strategy. 
To effectively analyze this project, as is the case when examining local 
governance in Milwaukee in general, it is necessary to untangle the several interwoven 
ideas that shape/d it (see Kenny & Zimmerman 2003). The project was also significantly 
influenced by the tenets of New Urbanism espoused by former Milwaukee Mayor John 
Norquist, who also blamed federal policies for the decline of central city neighborhoods 
and argued that a city cannot be built “on pity” (Norquist 1998). The tenets of New 
Urbanism emphasize the importance of creating a strong and singular image of the urban 
landscape that can compete favorably with suburbia. For these reasons, in the 
redevelopment project Norquist stressed aesthetic imperatives such as the need for 
continuity between new and old architecture, and the need for front porches, which 
recollect a brighter past and may help connect neighbors and build a spirit of community. 
In other words, the Lindsay Heights Redevelopment Project further provides an 
interesting case study because its goals were not just financial or architectural but social. 
While the social changes engendered by a redevelopment project are more difficult to 
measure, the role of social ideals in the discourse surrounding the redevelopment project 
provides valuable insight into the ways neoliberal policies are conceived and promoted. 
  
9 
I will argue that the redevelopment of the Lindsay Heights area represents a particular 
form of neoliberalism that manifests itself through neoliberal processes such as public-
private partnerships and draws into that narrative of neo-traditional values a specific 
branding of the city that embraces working class values and New Urbanist development 
philosophies. 
Methodology and Organization 
Chapter 2 will review the literature on the theories and topics most relevant to this 
study: neoliberalism, landscape, and new urbanism. Chapter 3 will utilize qualitative 
analysis of documents, newspaper articles and open-ended interviews with key actors to 
establish how governance and branding played a role in the project’s implementation. 
The range of interview subjects include both the former and current project managers, a 
member of the Department of City Development, a former assistant to Mayor Norquist 
and a community organizer from the neighborhood. Chapter 3 will also present more 
detailed information on the relevant history and demographics of Lindsay Heights, and 
will chart the stages of the redevelopment project as it was shaped by the discourse of 
neoliberalism and the values of its official sponsors. To initiate the analysis of the 
project’s impact, Chapter 4 will utilize regression analysis to provide statistical data 
regarding the changes in Lindsay Heights property values before and after the 
redevelopment project. Chapter 5 will provide a finer-grained study of the project’s 
impact by utilizing statistical analysis of three sample blocks that saw significant new 
construction during the project, in comparison with a control block that did not 
experience similar redevelopment. Chapter 6 will summarize the findings, discuss how 
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the project exemplifies neoliberal and New Urbanist ideals and drawbacks, and offer 
conclusions. 
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Chapter 2: Governance and Narratives 
 
The issues challenging the Lindsay Heights neighborhood are complex and relate 
to economic change, urban policies, and values that cover decades. The context for this 
pattern of development will be addressed in the next chapter. In the following, however, I 
explore key concepts associated with recent expressions of governance, giving particular 
attention to the discourse of neoliberalism. I will argue that local officials drew upon neo-
traditional values in developing the Lindsay Heights project and in evaluating its success. 
For that reason, the following also addresses the symbolic role of landscape, specifically 
in the form of New Urbanism, to evaluate policy and planning narratives.  
 
 
Neoliberalism 
 
To understand neoliberalism, one must go back to the classical liberalism of the 
18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries. This liberalism can be broken down into two primary types, 
American and British (Kenny 1992). Proponents of American liberalism wanted 
individual freedom and a completely free market system unfettered by state regulation 
(Sally, 1998). This American or Lockean style of liberalism stressed individual rights 
over government power. It was felt that any power given over to government would be at 
the expense of individual freedoms. Decentralization of power was preferred because it 
was assumed that local government would be more responsive to the needs of its 
citizenry (Kenny 1992). These concepts appealed in particular to wealthy land-owning 
men who viewed these policies as an opportunity to maintain or expand their wealth.  
The British style of liberalism common during this time period was often 
connected to Jeremy Bentham and was more utilitarian in nature; it held that the role of 
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government was to provide the greatest good for the greatest number of people by 
managing society’s problems. In the twentieth century American liberalism slowly 
morphed into this more utilitarian or egalitarian style of liberalism. Both styles of 
liberalism viewed the free market as the obvious economic system but their view on the 
role of government was somewhat different (Kenny 1992).  
By the 1930s the work of John Maynard Keynes helped solidify social 
movements, which eventually led to a more egalitarian liberalism. Liberal economic 
failures, progressive politics, labor unions, and the success of the New Deal all helped to 
strengthen egalitarian liberalism in the United States in the twentieth century (Hackworth 
2007). This new Keynesian approach called for government intervention and regulation 
of markets as well as the redistribution of wealth as a means of stimulating markets and 
creating a social safety net. This approach was not intended to undermine the capitalist 
system but to preserve it through regulation. As Jason Hackworth argues, markets are 
self-destructive without state intervention and regulation, and the ebbs and flows of the 
market often require intervention to generate artificial demand (Hackworth, 2007). This 
redistribution has taken many forms, such as food stamps and public housing; one can 
even argue that basic infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, amounts to wealth 
redistribution. Indeed, investment in infrastructure was part of the spatial fix that led the 
United States out of the Great Depression.  
This spatial fix, along with governmental policies, enabled suburbanization and 
the rise of the automobile (Harvey, 1985). It was suburbanization that, along with 
deindustrialization as an aspect of the changing global economy, led to the hollowing out 
of inner cities (Jackson, 1985). While suburbanization was not the direct result of 
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Keynesian policies, it played a role, along with poor economic conditions, in bringing 
into sharper focus the increasingly poor conditions found in many urban centers. These 
conditions, along with negative unanticipated consequences of the Keynesian model, led 
to the discourse of government failure that provided a platform for the neoliberal agenda. 
Some scholars trace the roots of neoliberalism back to the 1970s; however, many 
contend it only took firm hold with the election of Margaret Thatcher in the United 
Kingdom and Ronald Reagan in the United States (Peck and Tickell, 2007). The 
tumultuous economic conditions of the 1970s led many to view Keynesian policies as a 
failure. As urban metropolitan areas suburbanized and economies became less stable and 
profitable, cities experienced more disinvestment. These circumstances fostered the 
emergence of neoliberal rhetoric about limiting the role of government in free markets. 
Neoliberal policy indicated that the only time that government should involve themselves 
in the market is to ensure the continuation of free trade. This devolution of 
responsibilities from federal to state and local levels is often presented as a necessary step 
to restore the control of decision making to those who can respond to the needs of the 
citizenry most quickly and directly and release the federal government from fiscal 
responsibilities that have an adverse effect on national debt. 
Geographers and other social scientists have been interested in the ways the shift 
from a Keynesian to a more neoliberal ideology has affected all levels of government and 
governance. The shift away from government regulation and income redistribution to a 
more privatized, self-regulating system has gained a great deal of traction in recent 
decades. The call for smaller government and more personal freedoms has become a 
rallying cry of many conservatives. These neoliberal processes have provided systematic 
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advantages to some, often at the expense of others (Peck and Tickell, 2007). It should 
also be noted that neoliberalism is often discussed at the scale of the global economy and 
advocacy of open markets for capital. It is not evaluated as frequently in terms of the 
neoliberal city and even less frequently at the scale of the neighborhood. This is an 
important consideration as the impacts of these policies are often seen in urban areas in 
general and central city neighborhoods in particular (Hackworth 2007). 
Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore (2002), in their discussion of neoliberal 
processes, refer to aspects of change described as roll-back and roll-out neoliberalism. 
The roll-back neoliberalism stage refers to policies that eradicate or weaken social 
welfare investments—Keynesian artifacts such as welfare and public housing 
(Hackworth, 2007). The authors describe roll-out as the implementation of aggressive 
neoliberal policies to secure and expand the process of neoliberalization. These policies 
are often attached to specific local areas. 
Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell (2002) also use the concepts of roll-out and roll-
back to explain the processes behind neoliberalism. The authors go on to suggest, with 
the help of David Harvey, that much of what they refer to as “local neoliberalisms” 
constitutes a “race to the bottom” for many localities “in which competition seems to 
operate not as a beneficial hidden hand, but as an external coercive law forcing the lowest 
common denominator of social responsibility and welfare provision within a 
competitively organized urban system” (pg. 393). Peck and Tickell work on the 
assumption of scale that pits one city against another, but these same competitions can 
take place within the scale of a single city. 
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Public-private partnerships, in which public monies are used to leverage private 
investment,  support job and market development within a particular jurisdiction, thus 
providing government with a role for facilitating private sector development. There are 
many ways that cities have attempted to arrest capital and become more entrepreneurial. 
In the case of Milwaukee the government used culture as an economic development tool. 
Their approach was to utilize Milwaukee’s reputation as a hardworking town with solid 
mid-western values to compete with other localities to lure businesses back to the city 
(Kenny 1995). 
This shift in roles for local government to entrepreneurialism replaces a 
managerial one that also redefines relationships at the grass-roots level of the community.  
In many cases public-private partnerships rely on citizen participation to promote and 
legitimize this new form of governance. Sarah Elwood (2004) discusses how the “new 
localism” may provide opportunities for more citizen participation; however, these 
opportunities can come at a price. Neoliberalism has necessitated the involvement of 
local citizens in order to maintain the level of services that used to be provided by 
government programs. Practices that empower local citizens often have the effect of 
leaving communities with fewer opportunities because they are forced to compete for 
dwindling state or other resources. These resources also tend to be earmarked for specific 
purposes. Housing and renovation of housing stock often receive a great deal of attention. 
This attention is supposed to lead to reinvestment in the neighborhood as a whole; 
however, community organizations have admitted that housing has been put at the 
forefront at the expense of other critical neighborhood issues (Ghose 2005). 
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It is somewhat ironic that the shift away from a Keynesian approach toward a 
neoliberal scheme, which calls for less government involvement and more free market 
influence, often requires a considerable amount of government involvement for its 
implementation and continuation. Geographers have written extensively about 
neoliberalism and its consequences. These critiques have taken many forms. Often these 
critiques analyze neoliberal policies and their impact on governance, development, 
economics and democracy. Much of the neoliberal literature incorporates concepts of 
scale in their critiques. While the effects of neoliberal policies have been dissected at the 
local, regional, and global scales, arguably the neoliberal city requires greater attention as 
a focus of study rather than as an explanatory variable. While this is important work, 
perhaps the focus on scale has come at the expense of other geographical considerations 
such as landscape. 
As neoliberal policies become more prevalent in our society it is important to 
consider their impact on all aspects of society, including our physical and cultural 
landscapes. We must examine the positive and negative effects of these policies and 
determine whether it is possible to implement planning policies that would promote 
equality while working within the constructs of the contemporary, pervasive neoliberal 
agenda. 
 
The Neoliberal City 
In his 1978 essay, “From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The 
Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism,” Harvey argues that the 
processes of capital restructuring force cities and other urban centers into competition 
with each other. This drive to arrest mobile capital has resulted in a new form of 
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governance (Harvey 2010). This new form of urban governance is characterized by the 
public/private partnership. Harvey points out that these partnerships are often subsidized 
by the public sphere and require little risk on the part of the private sector and, often, 
these partnerships take place at the local scale (2008). 
Many authors have pointed out that one factor that has allowed for neoliberalism 
to become so pervasive is that it is a process and not an end state (Peck and Tickell 2002, 
Wilson 2004, Hackworth 2007). This process is geographically situated, so it takes on 
different forms depending on where the process occurs. It can include the removal of 
government programs or the implementation of public-private partnerships. In the case of 
Lindsay Heights, the processes were often linked to policies or local branding that were 
taking place at the time of the project. 
 
Neoliberal Landscapes 
Even before the adoption of neoliberal policies in the 1970s and 1980s, there 
existed a fundamental dance between developers and planners. The former were 
concerned with profits and profitability, while the latter, ideally, were concerned with 
public interests. As neoliberalism has gradually taken hold, it has removed power from 
the planners and given it over to developers and corporate interests. This is perhaps best 
exemplified by downtown development priorities along with the further expansion of 
suburbia. These bastions of conspicuous consumption are so prevalent that they have 
become a socially accepted norm, even a goal. However, as with any landscape, there is a 
flip-side, which is often the disenfranchised older, city neighborhoods. The standard 
neoliberal discourse of public failure often serves to solidify and exacerbate many of the 
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social issues experienced by city residents by driving investment and economic activity 
out. 
New Urbanism, to be discussed later, may offer an approach that works within the 
framework of neoliberal policies and approaches, while still producing a more equitable 
and sustainable landscape within older urban areas. Examples in Milwaukee include the 
Third Ward and the River Walk. While the Third Ward does not exemplify affordable 
housing, it does represent a high profile and successful mixed-use redevelopment strategy 
that shows that New Urbanism does not always equal new suburbanism.  
 
Landscape 
The word landscape, as envisioned by most people, generally takes on a physical 
form. However, landscapes are not simply the physical features but they also contain 
meaning that reflects the way they were created, represented and interpreted (Morin, 
2009). Landscapes, as an analytical tool, is significant when considered in terms of 
symbolic meaning, that is – as an expression of social, cultural, political and economic 
values for a particular reference group. If one considers landscapes to be a social 
construct then it is important to consider who exactly is constructing them. 
Denis Cosgrove has pointed out that the historical way of seeing landscape is 
important because it allows individuals to view landscape as property or commodity 
(1985). The commodification of landscape has become a universally accepted social 
practice. Ownership becomes paramount. It provides a mechanism to produce and 
reproduce landscapes. Ownership not only provides the owner with the ability to control 
the physical landscape, but it also allows for control over how the landscape is 
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represented and interpreted (Mitchell, 2003). Thus, the symbolic content of a landscape 
type gains hegemonic force, naturalizing social relations in a ‘taken-for-granted’ manner.  
To further develop the significance of landscape, it is acknowledged that humans 
have the power to control, shape, and reshape the landscape, resulting in what Schein 
calls a “discourse materialized” (1997). Landscapes can be seen as a collection of 
physical objects arranged in a particular way that lends meaning to the objects 
individually and as a whole. But because these meanings are the result of individual or 
group interpretations of the objects, a landscape can have multiple meanings, and these 
meanings can be under constant revision (Morin, 2009). For example, a grand plantation 
house might hold very different meanings for Southern whites and for blacks, or for 
Americans in 1860 and in 1960. The result of this constant revision is a landscape that is 
unique both physically and discursively. Landscapes complicate attempts at 
generalization. 
Approaches to understanding landscape differ, but there are several areas of 
commonality. While most landscapes have a physical component, it is the symbolic 
significance of landscape that plays a critical role in our understanding and interpretation. 
Those who wield power, be it social, cultural, economic, or gendered, are best positioned 
to create, represent, and interpret landscapes. Cultural norms and socially acceptable 
practices provide this important framework for conceptualizing landscape. 
 
Symbolic Landscape of Urban Neighborhoods 
While Keynesian policies attempted to resolve market problems to meet the 
‘public good’ they did display many deficiencies. In terms of resolving problems of the 
real estate market, there was a clear anti-urban bias that allowed for the expansion of the 
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suburbs while many urban areas experienced economic decline. This trend continued as 
neoliberalism took hold. Market forces saw little profit in urban redevelopment that did 
not meet certain criteria, such as direct proximity to downtown and/or waterfront areas. It 
should be pointed out that Milwaukee’s Mayor Norquist, in his embrace of New 
Urbanism, was very anti-suburb and saw Milwaukee’s older neighborhoods and 
commercial areas as offering desirable alternatives to the “characterless” qualities of tract 
housing and strip development.  His famous slide show, contrasting superior urban 
qualities with decidedly negative suburban development, provided a visual argument 
extolling the qualities of a pre-WWII city landscape.  In doing this, his promotion of the 
city was not unlike that of previous mayors who attempted to slow if not reverse the flow 
of middle-class residents on their way to suburbia.  What distinguished Norquist’s 
approach, however, was his ability to tap into a contemporary movement that applauded 
the character of older urban development – New Urbanism. 
 
New Urbanism 
The New Urbanism movement, which evolved in the 1990s and was codified in 
Michael Leccese and Kathleen McCormick’s 2002 publication, Charter of the New 
Urbanism, seeks to combat many hallmarks of twentieth century urban development: 
architectural anomalies, urban sprawl, segregation by race and income, loss of 
agricultural and green space beyond city limits, and the degradation of inner city 
communities. New Urbanists promote the restoration of existing urban neighborhoods 
while respecting historic neighborhood boundaries and architectural traditions. They 
favor mixed-use and diverse neighborhoods that promote pedestrian and mass transit 
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usage, and they urge planners to keep in mind the ways they construct not just buildings 
but communities. 
New Urbanist discourse also strongly promotes a sense of place. Former Mayor 
John Norquist was a founder and is now president of the Congress for New Urbanism, so 
it is not surprising that the city of Milwaukee has promoted the charter of New Urbanism 
(Voigt et al, 2006). A complex and ambitious approach, New Urbanism focuses on many 
aspects of architecture and the built environment, as well as on “making community” 
(Williams 2008). It asks architects, planners, local governments, and individuals to 
rethink, on several scales, the ways that people live and work in their “building, block, 
street, neighborhood, district, corridor, and region” (Moule 2002, 21). One way to 
understand New Urbanism is to think about older urbanism, and in particular, the walking 
city. 
The charter of New Urbanism promotes a return to mixed use communities that is 
more consistent with the walking city that was common before the transportation 
revolution. New Urbanists advocate design and planning that enable people to live, work, 
shop, and attend school in or near the neighborhoods where they live. New Urbanists 
have refined the concepts of spatial organization of Ebenezer Howard and Patrick 
Geddes, among others, and attempted to apply them to the modern city (Robbins 2004). 
The promotion of New Urbanism ideals often relies on a distinctive sense of place 
as well as nostalgia for a bygone era. These values can appeal to the residents or 
prospective residents of a given community (Kenny and Zimmerman, 2003). People who 
return to the city from suburbia are even sometimes referred to as “adventurers” who 
have chosen to conquer this rough landscape (Kenny and Zimmerman, 2003). 
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Supporters of New Urbanism, such as John Norquist, offer up New Urbanist ideas 
as a cure for the ills of the city. It is an egalitarian vision that arrests sprawl, promotes 
community and strengthens the heart of American cities so that they may return to their 
former glory. However, New Urbanism does have its detractors. Anyone who has studied 
urban landscapes understands the difference between promoting mixed-use and mixed-
income communities and seeing them become a reality. Intense segregation and other 
socio-economic factors conspire to make these goals very difficult to achieve in many 
communities. 
There are also critiques of the goals themselves. Due to the scale, location, and 
normative vision of some of the more famous planned New Urbanist communities, such 
as Celebration, Florida, some critics have taken to referring to the concept as new 
suburbanism. While Norquist's agenda in Milwaukee defies that characterization, it does 
draw upon similar neo-traditional values that some describe as naïve in their assumed 
link between the built-environment and community. Moreover, what this discourse of 
place and nostalgia often fails to consider are the class and race issues connected to the 
actual past (Kenny, 1995). It is easy for those who have not been the victims of racism to 
hearken back to a nostalgic past with longing. Non-whites who have lived through that 
same past undoubtedly recall it differently. 
In chapter three I will discuss how New Urbanism manifested itself in Milwaukee 
as well as Mayor Norquist’s influence on the changing landscape of neighborhoods in 
Milwaukee. 
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Chapter 3: The Changing Landscape of Lindsay Heights 
 
“Lindsay Heights steps into a new era” 
With this November 2008 headline, a Milwaukee Journal Sentinel reporter 
announced a significant award to the Lindsay Heights neighborhood from the local Zilber 
foundation (Pabst 2008). Philanthropist Joe Zilber chose the Lindsay Heights 
neighborhood organization (Walnut Way Conservation Corp) to administer an $875,000 
redevelopment grant over a four year period with an additional $250,000 “seed grant” to 
start a food co-op and commercial development. Although the neighborhood group’s 
success in grass-roots efforts was given credit for this choice, according to the newspaper 
account, WHEDA’s Lindsay Heights project initially brought attention to the 
neighborhood. Quoting WHEDA’s manager of community development, the newspaper’s 
narrative established the key elements of success, indicating:  
The area needed a lot of assistance and investment. Because of the available land, 
WHEDA, the city, banks and others launched a pilot project to jump-start housing 
development. [...] The WHEDA project built 165 new houses in the 
neighborhood, and 221 more have been rehabilitated. While WHEDA has made 
other mortgages, housing development in the area is now market-driven (Pabst 
2008). 
 
This progress report, written five years ago and before the collapse of the real estate 
market, gives WHEDA’s project credit for providing the necessary assistance to attract 
private sector housing development.  The news story did not question whether real estate 
development would provide the appropriate assistance for a poor neighborhood. Success 
was measured by construction activity and the possibility that the neighbors would regain 
a quality of life associated with an earlier era. That the necessary assistance came from 
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two different nonprofits, that is WHEDA and the Zilber Foundation, draws further on the 
discourse of neoliberalism. 
This chapter provides a qualitative evaluation of the Lindsay Heights 
Redevelopment Project by examining the parts to the success story, as described in this 
news story and by the ongoing commentary of local leaders (Interviews A, B and C). To 
situate the neighborhood in terms of its original and evolving character, the first part of 
the chapter will focus on descriptive statistics of the study area. In the second part of the 
chapter, I will analyze the leadership of Mayor Norquist given his influence on 
redevelopment in the city. This textual analysis contributes to an understanding of the 
links between the discourses of neoliberalism and planning priorities. Within that context, 
I will then discuss how quasi-state agencies such as WHEDA have played a role by 
providing resources to the project. Finally, I will discuss the landscape based on texts of 
New Urbanism further noting its links to neoliberalism via ‘neo-traditional’ values and 
consider the architectural continuity of the new homes in Lindsay Heights. 
 
Shifting Demographics and Neighborhood Change 
 
Historical Background 
 
Encompassing approximately 110 city blocks, the Lindsay Heights area is 
currently home to approximately 7000 residents (Figure 3-1). Located about two miles 
northwest of downtown Milwaukee, the neighborhood is bordered by Locust Street to the 
north, Walnut Street to the south, 12
th
 Street to the east, and 20
th
 Street to the west. 
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Figure 3-1: Lindsay Heights, City Homes and Proposed Park West Freeway (source: Author) 
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The area was named for Bernice Lindsay, a human rights activist who was an 
advocate for Milwaukee’s African-American communities throughout much of the 
twentieth century. She served as executive secretary of the North side YWCA from 1928 
to 1949, and was an original member of the Milwaukee Commission on Human Rights. 
In 1963 she founded Milwaukee’s Creative Center. However, among older members of 
Milwaukee’s African American community, she is best known for her pioneering activity 
in moving beyond the bounds of the early twentieth-century ghetto. In the immediate 
post-WWII years, when the residential boundaries of Milwaukee’s Black community 
were one-mile square and ended with its northern boundary of Walnut Street, Mrs. 
Lindsay purchased a house well beyond that on N. Humboldt (Trotter 1985; Interview C). 
Thus, in terms of the history of Black Milwaukee, the study area represents a period of 
growth for the community and movement beyond its older ghetto boundaries. By naming 
the project for Mrs. Lindsay, her activism and commitment to improved housing is 
honored.  
According to Charles T. O’Reilly et al, the area was mainly developed in the late 
1800s and early 1900s, with over 90% of the surviving housing stock built between 1880 
and 1920 (O’Reilly et al 1965). A predominantly working class neighborhood during its 
construction, Lindsay Heights began to experience change in the years immediately after 
WWII (O’Reilly et al 1965). Described as a “second generation” city due to the later 
impact of the Great Migration, Milwaukee’s African American population grew during 
the war years but its significant growth began in the 1950s and extended into the 1960s 
(Rose 1972). Thus, the expansion of African American neighborhoods matched post-war 
suburbanization. White flight and FHA loan guidelines, as well as other factors, gradually 
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transformed the area from a mostly white working class neighborhood to a more racially 
mixed and, in time, impoverished neighborhood. 
 
Demographic Information 
The census tracts that most closely approximate the land area known as Lindsay 
Heights between 1940 and 2000 consist of six tracts. From 1940 through 1960 their 
numbers were 27, 28, 37, 38, 50, and 51; these were bordered by Locust St. to the north, 
Galena St. to the south, 12th St. to the east and 20
th
 St. to the west (Appendix A; Figure 
A-1). In 1970 the tract numbers were changed to 118, 117, 102, 101, 86 and 85 but the 
tracts’ borders remained the same (Appendix A; Figure A-2). 
The census tract information for the Lindsay Heights area illustrates the severe 
social and economic stress that the community has had to endure since World War II 
(Table 3-1). In 1940 the area now known as Lindsay Heights represented 3.8% of 
Milwaukee’s overall population; by 2000 it fell to 1.1%. Perhaps this should not come as 
a surprise considering total housing stock fell from 6283 units in 1940 to 2302 by 2000. 
Beginning in 1950, when census information first became available at the census tract 
level, median income in Lindsay Heights was almost identical to the city wide average 
and by 1960 it was only $525 less than that of Milwaukee as a whole. However, by 1970 
median income had dropped to almost half that of the city wide average. Median income 
continued to fall relative to the city average until by 2000 it was 31% of the city average. 
Graduation rates were consistently lower than the city average and those living below 
poverty were often four to five times higher than the city of Milwaukee. Perhaps the only 
positive statistic relates to home values. While consistently less than the city average, 
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Table 3-1: 1940-2000 Consolidated Census Tract Data for Lindsay Heights and Milwaukee 
 
 L.H. MKE L.H. MKE L.H. MKE L.H. MKE L.H. MKE L.H. MKE L.H. MKE 
 
Census Tracts* 1940 1940 1950 1950 1960 1960 1970 1970 1980 1980 1990 1990 2000 2000 
Population 
Total 22,212 587,492 21,287 637,392 20,637 741,324 14,694 717,372 10,058 636,212 8639 628,088 6354 596,974 
White 17257   17907   6533   860     453,970   381,717 163 270,989 
Black 1   227       13757   9710 145,850 8448 189,408 5944 220,432 
White Foreign 
Born 4951   3126   196                   
Other 3   27       77   348   191   106   
                             
Median Income N/A   $3,306  $3,340  $5,169  $5,694  $5,899  $10,262  $8,391  $16,028  $11,079  $32,359  $4,984  $16,028  
% High School+ 
Graduates N/A       N/A   24% 49% 36% 64% 43% 79% 30% 64% 
% Below 
Poverty Line N/A       N/A 10% 33% 8% 37% 11% 55% 12% 39% 11% 
Housing:               
 
Total Stock 6283   6446   5926   4533   3476 253,445 2522 254,204 2302 249,225 
Owner-Occupied 1719   2231   1779   1104   870   672   608 105,235 
Black     27   777   888   807       N/A   
White     2204   1002   211   63       N/A   
Rental 4387   4178   3817   3047   2174   1850   2174   
Black     28   2589   2865   2115       N/A   
White     4150   1228   185   59       N/A   
 
Vacant Lots 126   94   407   452   401 11,628   13,664 331 17,037 
Median Home 
Value $3,223  $4,084 $7,285  $11,086  $9,033  $15,100  $7,750  $18,200  $15,283  $45,500  $22,467  $76,600  $40,167  $45,500  
 
* Lindsay Heights (LH) figures are compiled/consolidated from the 6 census tracts that comprise the area that became Lindsay Heights. Figures for LH Median 
Home Value and Median Income represent averages of the mean values from each of the 6 census tracts. See Appendix A for complete data broken down by the 
6 census tracts. 
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median home value in Lindsay Heights showed a dramatic rebound between 1990, when 
median home value was $22,467, and 2000 when it reached $40,167. Coupled with a 
drastic drop in home values in Milwaukee as a whole this brought Lindsay Heights to 
within $5,333 of the city average (Table 3-1).  
In 1940 these census tracts in Milwaukee were overwhelmingly white, with only 
one of the 22,212 residents listed as black and only three listed as other. Of the 6,283 
homes, 4,387 were rentals, with an average home value across all six tracts of $3,223. 
There were 126 lots vacant (Table 3-1; Appendix A: Table A-1 for detailed analysis). 
 By 1950 these census tracts begin to show a shift in demographics. The number 
of black residents increased to 227. The overwhelming majority of these new black 
residents were located in census tracts 28 and 37, which are the southern and eastern most 
of the six tracks. Median income in the area averaged $3,306, which was just $35 or 1% 
less than the city of Milwaukee as a whole. Approximately two-thirds of the housing 
stock remained rentals, and the average value of the homes in the six census tracts 
increased by $4,000 (Appendix A: Table A-2). 
The 1960 census data showed a dramatic shift in population demographics, but 
total population remained fairly constant. Black residents constituted two-thirds of the 
overall population. The average of median income for the six census tracts was $5,169, 
compared to $5,694 for the city of Milwaukee. Perhaps the most notable statistic is the 
drop in total housing stock, with the six census tracts losing over 400 homes (Appendix 
A: Table A-3).   
This loss was further exaggerated during the 1960s with the clearance of over 
1500 houses for the planned construction of the Park West Freeway (Wisconsin 
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Highways). This failed project cut a broad swath through the study area and increased 
uncertainty regarding the area’s future (Figure 3-1). By 1970 over ninety percent of the 
residents in these census tracts were black. The average of median incomes had only 
increased by $800 over the past 10 years, which was a little more than half of the city of 
Milwaukee’s average of $10,262. Over 30% of residents were living below the poverty 
line, compared to 8.1% in the city as a whole. Total housing stock in the census tracts 
dropped by nearly 1,400 units since 1960, and median home value went down in all but 
one census tract (Appendix A: Table A-4). 
1980 showed a decline of over 4,600 residents since 1970, as well as a loss of over 
1,000 housing units. The percentage of high school graduates in the six census tracts was 
approximately half that of the city as a whole, and the percentage of people living below 
the poverty line was still three times as great as the average for the city of Milwaukee. 
The only positive indicator in the census data for the period from 1970 to 1980 was that 
median home values in the area doubled. However with an average of the medians of 
$15,283 for the six census tracts, housing stock was still just one-third of the city average 
of $45,500 (Appendix A: Table A-5). 
By 1990 the area had lost an additional 1,400 residents and over 940 housing 
units. Median income remained about one-third of the city average and over half the 
families living in these census tracts were living below the poverty line. While home 
values increased they still remained less than a third of the city average (Appendix A: 
Table A-6). 
The 2000 census showed a continued drop in population and housing stock in 
spite of the redevelopment project having been under way for five years. In addition 
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median income fell by half and the percentage of high school graduates dropped by 12%. 
The number of renters increased while the number of owner-occupied homes fell. The 
only positive statistics, when compared to 1990 is a 16% drop in those living below the 
poverty line and a substantial increase in median home value. However median home 
values were still less than half of Milwaukee as a whole (Appendix A: Table A-7). 
Unfortunately, the census tracts covering this area changed radically in 2010, 
dividing the area up into several different neighboring census tracts. This makes it 
impossible to present comparable data from 2010. However, according to the Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel article referred to at the beginning of this chapter, available statistics 
indicated that 48% of area residents live below the poverty line, 25% are unemployed, 
45% do not have a high school diploma and less than 5% have a college degree (Pabst 
2008). While the headline claimed that Lindsay Heights had stepped into a new era, the 
number of people living below the poverty line had increased. The significant part of the 
story, as indicated by a WHEDA staff person, was the market activity in housing 
development: “We believe this has been very successful because we have shown that new 
home construction could be built in the central city” (Pabst 2008). 
 
Governance and the Discourse of Neoliberalism 
As stated earlier, neoliberalism has had a profound effect on governance at the 
local level. The reduction in availability of federal funds to cities has forced them to 
resort to a form of governance that relies on nonprofits, public/private partnerships, 
quasi-state organizations and the leveraging of funds to maintain basic services or 
promote growth. In many cases public-private partnerships rely on citizen participation to 
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promote and legitimize this new form of governance. While this may provide 
opportunities for citizens in a given community these opportunities require citizens in 
certain communities to put forth much more effort to maintain services that other 
communities take for granted. Often the practices that empower local citizens also leave 
communities with fewer opportunities because they are forced to compete for dwindling 
state or other resources. These resources also tend to be earmarked for housing and 
renovation of housing stock. This is supposed to lead to reinvestment in the neighborhood 
as a whole; however, community organizations have admitted that housing has been 
focused on at the expense of other critical neighborhood issues (Ghose 2005). This focus 
on housing can be the result of many different factors but one factor that often plays an 
important role is local leadership. 
 
Milwaukee’s Leadership 
 
To understand the role that leadership played in the Lindsay Heights 
redevelopment project it is important to understand the goals and aspirations of the city’s 
Mayor John Norquist, who was in office for fifteen years (1988-2003) and presided over 
the rollout process that set the context for the Lindsay Heights redevelopment project. 
In his book, The Wealth of Cities, Norquist argues that “you can’t build the city 
on pity” (1998). He claims that the process by which cities seek federal funds for 
development or other programs is unsustainable. His assertion is that if cities continue to 
ask for federal subsidies because they have been the victims of economic hardships, the 
pity that generated the initial offering will turn to contempt (Norquist, 1998). Norquist 
goes on to state that “No one, particularly no one with money—whether the federal 
government or private investors—likes to be around a loser” (1998). This clearly reflects 
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the neoliberal rhetoric regarding the changing roles of public investment in social 
welfare. He considers the city a product of market influences and contends that cities 
would exist even if their governments were removed, because cities, by the nature of their 
locations, are where people come together to trade (1998).  Norquist drew upon cultural 
capital to brand his city in the competition to attract capital.  
In his book, Norquist also proposes cutting government spending, reducing 
welfare programs, lowering taxes, increasing the police force, revamping the public 
school system through vouchers and reducing or eliminating public housing (1998). It is 
his opinion that if cities can accomplish these goals they can position themselves to be 
competitive in the market. These are some examples of rollback and rollout processes. 
Many of the goals set forth by Norquist fall perfectly in line with neoliberal ideology that 
promotes less government, lower taxes and more personal responsibility. 
Norquist dedicates an entire chapter of his book to an explanation of how New 
Urbanism can solve many of the development issues facing cities today. Norquist is no 
fan of suburbia and considers suburban regions to be in competition for capital just like 
other cities. It is this narrative of competition that leads Norquist and Milwaukee to 
embrace place and New Urbanism as tactics to compete in a neoliberal world. The 
relationship between New Urbanism, neoliberalism and the new construction in the 
Lindsay Heights project is taken up later in the chapter. 
Within the narrative of competition, place can be very important. Milwaukee, like 
many other cities, has attempted to cash in on its cultural capital (Kenny, 1995). These 
cultural resources have been used to try to attract investment by promoting a particular 
lifestyle or tradition. Milwaukee has a history and culture that differentiates it from 
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suburbia and other localities. Of course this type of city branding is nothing new. 
Milwaukee has been trying to attract investment through self-promotion for over one 
hundred years (Kenny and Zimmerman, 2003). To make a distinction between the 
mayor’s role as city booster and the work of previous mayors, a contrast between his 
predecessor, Mayor Henry Maier (1960 – 1980), and his agenda is illustrative.  Mayor 
Maier’s attempt to maintain Milwaukee’s population and tax base involved efforts to 
slow suburbanization by appealing to his working and middle-class, white ethnic base 
(Gurda 1999).  Norquist emphasized the growth of Milwaukee’s downtown, the attraction 
of a creative class clientele, and the return of middle-class homeowners to the city 
(Kenny & Zimmerman 2003).  
What has changed is the type of branding or image the city tries to cultivate. It has 
gone from a city that celebrates its industrial strength to one that tries to recapture the 
essence of that lost strength. Ironically, the promotion of working class values and the 
branding of Milwaukee as a genuine American city have attempted to arrest capital that 
rarely benefits the working class (Kenny, 1995, Kenny and Zimmerman, 2003). In fact, 
Norquist primary focus in the first years of his administration was on the development of 
Milwaukee’s Downtown. Complaints from neighborhood leaders about the lack of 
attention to the poorer areas of the city finally brought a response in 1995 when 
construction began on the City Homes subdivision. The subdivision is located on the 
southwest corner of Lindsay Heights (Figure 3-1) at the corner of 20
th
 street and W. 
Walnut St .The Redevelopment Authority of the City of Milwaukee used eminent domain 
to purchase existing homes in the area in an effort to create this new subdivision (Herguth 
2009). 
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WHEDA and the Origins of the Lindsay Heights Redevelopment Plan 
WHEDA personnel cite a more indirect influence on the development of the 
Lindsay Heights project (Interview A 2011). The initial push by the Wisconsin Housing 
and Economic Development Authority (WHEDA) came in response to Fannie Mae’s 
alarming “Report on Poverty in America,” which showed that over 40% of residents in 
the Lindsay Heights area were living in extreme poverty. WHEDA developed the 
Milwaukee Urban Commitment in 1995 (WHEDA 2009). They pledged $100 million to 
be used in a five-year investment plan for their newly formed Urban Initiative Area 
(UIA) (Derus, 2000). This money was earmarked to underwrite low-interest loans and 
back other commercial ventures in the area. At the inception of the project, WHEDA’s 
primary goal was to help first-time low- to middle-income families secure mortgages. 
This public-private partnership required local banks to make the loan but held WHEDA 
responsible in case of default. 
In the dynamics of public-private partnerships, WHEDA appears difficult to 
categorize at first glance. It is, in a sense, a quasi-government organization akin to local 
development commissions that have a public role associated with development charges 
but maintain separation in order to exercise independence in program implementation and 
resource allocation.  The organization was established by the state in 1972 under the 
original name, the Wisconsin Housing Authority. WHEDA’s director and six members of 
its twelve-person Board of Directors are appointed by the governor and confirmed by the 
state legislature. The rest of the board of directors is comprised of two state senators (one 
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from each party), two state representatives (one from each party), and the secretaries of 
the Wisconsin Departments of Administration and Commerce (WHEDA 2009).  
Despite this, WHEDA defines itself as “an independent authority, not a state 
agency” (WHEDA 2009). WHEDA programs are not funded by taxes but by “the sale of 
revenue bonds [which] allow us to fund financing programs that help stimulate affordable 
housing and economic development throughout the state” (WHEDA 2009). From its 
origins, WHEDA focused on housing for low and middle income families, the elderly, 
and the disabled, attempting to use housing as an economic redevelopment tool. The 
organization initially received $250,000 in seed money from the state of Wisconsin, and 
was empowered to make construction, rehab, and mortgage loans for the development of 
low and moderate income housing projects. In 1973 they received a favorable decision 
from the Wisconsin Supreme Court on the constitutionality of their authority, and went 
on to issue over $27 million in housing revenue bonds and making loans through the 
Section 8 Multifamily Loan Program and the Veterans Single Family Home Loan 
Program. In 1979 they repaid their original seed money from the state of Wisconsin. In 
1983 they changed their name from the Wisconsin Housing Authority to WHEDA. In 
2009, WHEDA claimed over $3 billion in assets (WHEDA 2009). 
WHEDA’s position in between the public and private spheres makes it difficult to 
plug it into the public-private equation when analyzing its relationship to neoliberal 
policies. At the same time, perhaps its hybrid public-private nature makes WHEDA a 
fundamentally neoliberal construction. 
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Initial Stages of the Lindsay Heights Redevelopment Project 
Near the outset, WHEDA appointed a staff member to oversee the initiative, 
which began in relatively modest terms. At first, WHEDA’s rather small staff worked 
with city officials to clear trash and abandoned vehicles from the area and to step up 
efforts to reduce crime. Milwaukee Police provided Area Saturation Patrol (ASP) units 
that allowed residents to report with relative anonymity on local criminal activity 
(WHEDA 2009, Interview A 2011). The Department of Neighborhood Services increased 
efforts to address vacant and boarded-up buildings and to demolish condemned buildings 
(WHEDA 2009). 
Between 1995 and 1997, WHEDA also sought out local non-profit organizations 
with whom they could partner and settled on the YMCA Community Development 
Corporation. In meetings with community members at the north side YMCA and 
elsewhere, the staff member solicited input from local residents about their concerns and 
desires for their neighborhood. This practice falls in line with neoliberal forms of 
governance that call for increased decision making at increasingly smaller scales (Martin, 
2003). WHEDA officials made an effort to establish what these residents were hoping to 
accomplish, and designed a set of goals to revitalize the neighborhood without adversely 
affecting its current residents (Rathman 2002).  
The staff member’s long description of the stages of the redevelopment initiative 
demonstrate his/her commitment to helping residents achieve their aims, but it also 
provides important insight into the ways in which small numbers of unelected but 
dedicated individuals can influence the course of public-private partnerships and thus 
have a profound impact on public and private resources and interests. 
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My view of leadership was different from an awful lot of other people’s. I believe 
[…] if you want to help [an area] to change, you have to know what the people 
who live and do business in that area think. Not necessarily the elected officials. 
Not necessarily the pastors of big churches. Not necessarily the businessmen with 
the most money in the area. You really need to work with people who live there. 
And you need to help them achieve what they want to achieve for their own 
neighborhood. So in that regard, I went to all kinds of […] community meetings, 
church meetings, and volunteer group meetings. And I’d go in and sit in the back 
and watch for the person that everybody walked by to speak to. Or sat down and 
visited with. Because I figured, OK, that’s a person whose opinion counts. That’s 
somebody everybody else respects. [… T]hat’s the person that I want to talk to. 
(Emphasis added, Interview A 2011). 
 
While the staff member describes consulting a wide variety of ordinary citizens to 
determine the desires of local residents, the staff member also implies, in his/her opening 
words, that others in his/her role do not necessarily do this. One obvious drawback of 
using private agencies to address public concerns is the fact that unelected actors may not 
feel the same responsibility and incentive to honor the wishes of constituents that elected 
officials, at least theoretically, might feel. The very idea that one non-elected individual 
working for a quasi-governmental agency can exert such influence over a community to 
which he/she has no other attachment also speaks broadly to the type of neoliberal 
policies that allow the few with power to shape the fate of other citizens. 
The staff member concluded that what the residents desired was a return to the 
neighborhood that they remembered. Many residents were worried that they would lose 
their homes to the city through eminent domain, as had happened in the 1950’s and 60’s 
due to freeway construction, or more recently in the nearby City Homes Subdivision 
development (WHEDA 2009). Residents did not want to see their neighborhood replaced 
by large public housing projects, and they wanted to see more homes owner-occupied and 
well maintained (WHEDA 2009; Interview A 2011). 
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In the summer of 1995 WHEDA, working with the YMCA, provided a budget of 
$50,000 for a “Paint and Fix-Up Program” (WHEDA 2009). Local residents would be 
reimbursed up to $500 for external repair projects that they completed on their homes. 
The plan was meant to improve facades, foster neighborhood pride, and encourage 
residents to help themselves. To encourage participation, WHEDA simplified the process 
of reimbursement and did not require residents to show permits, hire licensed contractors, 
or submit their work to building inspectors. The staff member explains how some 
residents were reluctant, nonetheless, to participate: 
It took us a while to get people to use that program […] People had had some bad 
experiences. For instance, if they’d worked with the city to use any of the city’s 
grant money, there were so many strings attached to it. Like, OK, you’re gonna 
have a grant to fix this, but that means an inspector’s gonna come in your house 
and there’s gonna be all these other things that you also have to fix, you have to 
bring everything up to code. And so they were afraid that […] we’d be sending 
inspectors and that kind of stuff. And we said, no. Understand that this is for you 
to fix what you want to fix. Now, we recommend that you fix it to code, because 
you’re gonna be the one in trouble if ever that comes up. But we’re no code-
enforcers. We’re just providing the grant to do this. Well, what color paint can I 
get? Any color paint you want. Well, people hadn’t had choices before. [… N]ot 
only did people feel that they had no power to change conditions in their 
neighborhood, but they had no choices either. So, with this tiny little program we 
were offering choices. And we were offering people an opportunity to help 
themselves. We weren’t gonna do it for them (Interview A 2011). 
 
Several tropes of neoliberal ideology shine through the staff member’s narrative. 
Government is characterized as an intruder, and regulation is viewed as a nuisance or a 
threat that impedes progress and limits individual choice, rendering residents powerless 
to change their living conditions. This representation posits government as a caretaker of 
people who do not or cannot take care of themselves. In contrast, quite literally, 
WHEDA’s 2009 executive report on the redevelopment project lists one of their goals as 
follows: “Promote self-help among residents rather than waiting for federal grant dollars 
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to fix all physical housing problems at once” (WHEDA 2009). The tenor of these 
comments suggests certain condescension toward the local residents, whose wishes 
WHEDA professed to honor. 
Certainly aesthetic improvements can play an important role in (re)generating 
residents’ enthusiasm for their homes and neighborhood. They can also begin to change 
outsiders’ perceptions of the area, or change the neighborhood’s brand, which can affect 
property values. But improvements to a façade can of course mask more serious and even 
hazardous problems in a home’s construction. If a home has a broken staircase, mold, or 
a radon problem, spending $500 on new exterior paint might not be the best use of scarce 
resources. The staff member’s ambivalence about building codes can be interpreted as a 
preference for beauty over safety. Nevertheless, WHEDA’s decision to allot resources to 
elements that shape perception seemed to help build momentum and belief in the 
possibility of real positive change in the neighborhood; it also helped WHEDA gain the 
trust and cooperation of local residents. This would be essential for later stages of the 
redevelopment project. 
By most accounts, this initial Paint and Fix-Up initiative was a great success, and 
many residents, spurred on by the initiative, spent much more than the reimbursed $500 
to make further home improvements (WHEDA 2009). However, the staff member 
reported initial disappointment: 
[A]t the end of the season […] a couple of the young people from the Y drove me 
around the neighborhood to show me all the projects. Of course this was 
November. Things look gloomy in November. […] And I wasn’t saying much, 
and the young man […] looked at me […] and said, “You don’t look very happy.” 
I said, “Well, I was kind of hoping that I would see more… you know, more fix-
up for what we had invested.” And he said, “Oh, for crying out loud, you’re 
looking for paint on houses.” He said, “You gotta be looking for raw wood. […] 
You can’t paint raw wood right away.” So I said, “Well, what happened to all the 
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paint?” And he said, “It’s stored for next year. They’re gonna do it.” (Emphasis 
added 2011) 
 
The staff member’s comments illustrate the ways in which socially constructed notions of 
a landscape (and of what is to be valued in a landscape) can influence one individual who 
then can influence the entire project.   
The staff member’s emphasis on publicly visible aesthetic improvements 
resembles the influence that Milwaukee Mayor John Norquist later had on the design of 
new homes to be built in Lindsay Heights: he stipulated that new homes had to have a 
porch big enough for him (a very tall man) to stretch out on (Interviews D and E 2011). 
Both of these preferences can be traced to nostalgic notions of how good old-fashioned 
neighborhoods are supposed to look. 
Beyond the aesthetic concerns of planners and residents were the understandable 
concerns residents had about an outside entity meddling in their neighborhood at all. The 
neighborhood had already been scarred by the use of eminent domain in the 1960s to 
clear homes from an area designated for highway construction that never materialized 
(Figure 3-1). More recently, the city had used eminent domain to clear all homes from 
several blocks in the area to enable the construction of the City Homes development.  
 
Infill and Construction Stage 
In contrast to the City Homes development, WHEDA chose to use a scattered site 
infill approach to develop new homes among existing homes. This would make newer 
homes less conspicuous and would make the redevelopment process less disruptive. After 
attending a conference on the use of scattered infill housing in redevelopment initiatives, 
WHEDA’s executive director, Fritz Ruf, and director of emerging markets, Wyman 
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Winston, sought out ways to apply this approach in Milwaukee. They gained the support 
of Governor Thompson and Mayor Norquist and negotiated a plan to pay the City of 
Milwaukee $5,000 per lot for a total of $500,000 for “identification and pre-development 
environmental review” of 100 lots that the city owned in the Lindsay Heights area 
(WHEDA 2009, Interviews A and E 2011).  
These lots would then be sold for $1.00 as long as buyers met certain criteria, 
including a promise to build a residence on the site within one year. Financing was 
secured for many new residents through low interest rate mortgages underwritten by 
WHEDA. In many cases these new residents would not otherwise have qualified for a 
standard loan. These new residents were also required to take home ownership classes 
and pay down any outstanding debt and establish new bill-paying habits (Derus, 2000, 
Interview B 2011). The City of Milwaukee established a Tax Incremental Finance 
District or TID in 2001, which was the first TID for a residential neighborhood in 
Milwaukee. The TID offered residents $10,000 in forgivable loans for new home 
construction or for rehabilitation of existing properties (Interview B 2011). Table 3-2 
outlines the private sector “partners” that collaborated with WHEDA in this development 
strategy. 
In addition to its partnership with the YMCA, established in the Paint and Fix-up 
Initiative, WHEDA continued creating partnerships with local community organizations. 
To date, their local partners have grown to include the Clarke Street Neighborhood 
Association, the Johnson Park Neighborhood Association, the Phillis Wheatley 
Neighborhood Association, the Saint Paul Resident Association and the Walnut Way 
Conservation Corporation.
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Table 3-2: Lindsay Heights Partners 
Lenders: 
Eight lenders provided the upfront capital in the amount of $1.7 million needed to    start the 
Lindsay Heights Tax Incremental Financing District 
 
 State Financial Bank 
 Mutual Savings Bank 
 North Shore Bank 
 St Francis Bank 
 Northern Trust Bank 
 M&I Bank 
 Firstar Bank 
 Guaranty Bank 
(Note – LISC provided a 25% guarantee as an incentive to attract the local lending partners) 
 
 
Lenders: 
Nine lenders provided the additional capital in the amount of $1 million needed to  
continue the Lindsay Heights Tax Incremental Financing District 
 
 State Financial Bank 
 Bank Mutual 
 North Shore Bank 
 MidAmerica (St Francis) Bank 
 Northern Trust Bank 
 M&I Bank 
 Guaranty Bank 
 Anchor Bank 
 Wells Fargo 
 
 
Builders: 
 
 Duke Custom Homes 
 JR McBride Real Estate LLC 
 Kuhs Quality Homes 
 New Urban Builders 
 
 
Real Estate Professionals: 
 
 Century 21 Realtors 
 Shorewest Realtors 
 Terapak Realtors 
 Williams & Associates 
 Homemark Realty 
 
(Source: WHEDA Public Powerpoint, 2007) 
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Both WHEDA and the City of Milwaukee wanted to keep the redevelopment 
process market-driven and not tied to government subsidies, so WHEDA did not select 
particular builders but opened the market to any interested builder. Builders were, 
however, expected to “work within basic design and construction guidelines” (WHEDA 
2009, Interview D 2011). WHEDA worked to arrange low-interest loans from local 
lenders and to get local realtors to lower their commissions to 2.5% (WHEDA 2009). To 
show buyers what was possible in Lindsay Heights, WHEDA paid for construction of 
three model homes (Interview A 2011). 
The first three homes, like many that followed, were prefabricated or modular 
homes. This type of housing was chosen for several reasons. Due to the assembly line 
manufacturing style of most modular homes, their cost is often lower than a site-built 
home of similar size. Most of these homes consist of long narrow boxes that are married 
together and or stacked on top of each other on site. These long, narrow boxes fit well on 
the narrow lots that constitute many inner city lots. The speed with which these structures 
can be assembled is also a benefit in an area that has higher than average crime rates, 
since the cost of securing the construction site from theft and vandalism is kept to a 
minimum. In addition to these attributes, many housing manufacturers offer exteriors that 
mimic the styles found in early twentieth century construction. Many manufacturers offer 
floor plans that are a reasonable facsimile of a bungalow or a workers cottage. This made 
it possible for project organizers to adhere to Mayor Norquist’s New Urbanist principle 
of maintaining architectural continuity.  
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The Landscape of Nostalgia 
While architectural continuity is a principle of New Urbanism, design of the new 
structures served a symbolic purpose as well. In keeping with Mayor Norquist’s 
celebration of the city versus the suburb, planning guidelines ostensibly attempted to 
reinforce a sense of local character – to allow new owners to “return to the neighborhood 
that they remembered,” as one WHEDA staff person stated (Interview A 2011). Real 
Estate developer and philanthropist, Joe Zilber, reminisced about his childhood in this 
same neighborhood, where his family lived above his parents’ store. He was quoted as 
saying that he hoped that “current residents can enjoy the kind of prosperity families from 
his era did”. Given his age, these childhood memories were drawn from the 1920’s and 
1930’s, thus glossing over the lack of prosperity that most communities experienced 
during the Great Depression. (Pabst 2008). 
Given the age and original character of the neighborhood, that character would be 
represented by the duplexes and workers’ cottages shown in Figures 3-2 and 3-3 
respectively. Structures such as these were the dominant house-types of working-class 
Milwaukee neighborhoods built from the late-nineteenth century to about 1910. The 
workers cottage was more prevalent during mid- to late-nineteenth century development, 
particularly in unskilled worker neighborhoods. The Milwaukee Duplex became the 
dominant house type by the beginning of the twentieth century. Although Milwaukee had 
a relatively high rate of homeownership at that time, as the prevalence of duplexes would 
suggest, the majority of households rented (Hubka & Kenny 2006). The statistics shown 
in Table 3-1 reaffirm the predominance of rental properties. 
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Figure 3-2 Existing Workers Cottage in Study Area (Source: Author) 
 
 
Figure 3-3: Existing Duplex in Study Area  (Source: Author) 
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In contrast to these typical house forms of the earlier era, new construction 
sponsored by the Lindsay Heights project emphasizes larger houses.  For example, the 
relatively typical duplex shown in Figure 3-3, which has not undergone recent 
renovation, can be compared to the new structure shown in Figure 3-4. One can discern 
several architectural similarities that demonstrate continuity with the existing homes on 
the street front: a large, covered front porch; wide siding with large trim boards 
surrounding the windows; and box returns at the ends of the gables.  However, despite its 
architectural similarities, it is a single-family house intended for owner-occupancy. Thus, 
while similar in mass, it serves as a different form of tenancy and a different level of 
prosperity.  
 
 
Figure 3-4: New Home in Study Area, Source: Author 
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Figure 3-5: New Bungalow in Study Area (Source: Author) 
In a comparable way, the new houses built in bungalow-style symbolically 
represent a different social status and degree of modernity than do the Milwaukee worker 
cottages (Figure 3-5). Bungalows would only be found in neighborhoods built after 1910, 
and in Milwaukee, most were built after 1920. Despite the anachronism displayed by this 
choice, it is understandable that the bungalow would be selected as an equivalent to the 
cottage. The bungalow is the “gold standard” of early-twentieth housing in America. The 
bungalow is widely viewed as one of the first homes to incorporate all of the modern 
amenities that people expect in a home (Hubka lecture notes 2009). The style suggests 
the comfortable, modern living of an aspiring middle-class. This type of nostalgia 
markets the older neighborhoods to those who “remember” a period in which Milwaukee 
had a more robust economy for industrial workers. Thus, in a nostalgic way – or perhaps 
a New Urbanist one, they appeal to those who hope to bring in homeowners who can 
raise property values and “prime the pump” for further development. However this does 
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not resolve significantly the conditions of poverty for those already living in the 
neighborhood. 
Since 1995, over 160 new homes have been built in the Lindsay Heights area, and 
over 350 existing buildings have been rehabilitated. These numbers fall significantly 
short of those lost in the neighborhood since the end of World War II but they stand in as 
a landscape honoring Milwaukee’s past – and the prospect of market-driven 
development. In the next chapters, I will discuss the financial impact of this 
redevelopment on the neighborhood and on the city as a whole.
 1
0
3
 
 
50 
Chapter 4: Statistical Analysis of Changes in Lindsay Heights Property Values 
 
Regression Analysis 
This chapter utilizes regression analysis to try to establish the relationships that 
may exist among different variables pertaining to housing stock in the Lindsay Heights 
redevelopment area. In particular, I was concerned with home values and how they were 
clustered, as well as how that clustering may have changed over the course of the 
redevelopment project. I was also interested in determining which variables were 
significant to home values and how their significance may have changed over time. 
This analysis was designed to analyze the city of Milwaukee’s M-PROP data in 
an effort to understand how the Lindsay Heights Redevelopment Project has influenced 
residential property values in the neighborhood currently referred to as Lindsay Heights. 
The City of Milwaukee property data from 1995, 2000 and 2005 for the parcels within 
the boundaries of Lindsay Heights were acquired from the American Geographical 
Society Library. In order to focus on residential properties, this data set was manipulated 
in an effort to remove all non-residential parcels and all parcels without an assessed value 
or a structure in place on the parcel.  
After considering and calculating the different values that were available through 
the Master Property Files (MPROP) for the City of Milwaukee that could be utilized to 
perform the calculations necessary I determined that a map of assessed value per square 
foot should be utilized to perform the statistical calculations. I then calculated for all 
three data sets (Figure 4-1). Based on the spatial distribution of the map I determined that 
further analysis of the data was necessary. I performed a basic statistical analysis of the 
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assessed values, as well as a multiple linear regression analysis using the modified data 
sets and Getis-Ord Gi* on all three data sets. 
 
Figure 4-1: Lindsay Heights Map Showing Assessed Value Per Square Foot  
(Source: City of Milwaukee M-PROP Data; Author’s Analysis) 
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Results 
I performed multiple linear regression analysis on all three data sets using SPSS 
18. This analysis was designed to establish the effect of lot area, building area and value 
per square foot on overall assessed value of the residential parcels in the study area. The 
regression model for all three data sets was highly significant. For the 1995 data set these 
three variables produced an R² of .839, which means that these three variables explain 
83.9% of the variation of total assessed value. The 2000 model had an R² of .763 and the 
2005 model saw its R² value drop to.631. This indicates that as we move forward 
longitudinally these variables are explaining less and less of the variation. The F-values 
for 1995, 2000 and 2005 were 3134.645, 1757.617 and 1009.664 respectively. The p-
values for the variables for all three data sets were significant at the 5% level. The 
multicollinearity statistics were not an issue in any of the models as VIF values were well 
fewer than five (see Appendix B). 
One of the more interesting changes in the three models relates to the Beta. In 
1995 parcel area was the most significant variable at 0.764; by 2000 it had fallen to 
0.569, and by 2005 it was the least significant variable at just 0.149 (Appendix B). I will 
discuss some possible reasons for this later in the chapter.  This shift in Beta, along with 
considerations for doing more detailed statistical analysis, led me to conclude that value 
per square foot would be the most equitable value to employ for basic statistical analysis 
and cluster analysis. Therefore, I calculated basic statistical analysis of value per square 
foot for all parcels in the study area.  
The statistic that may be the most puzzling is the total number of parcels, which 
dropped from 1810 in 1995 to 1640 in 2000. This would represent a dramatic lack of 
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infill in the first five years of a project deliberately geared toward infill. This reduction in 
total parcels was a result of a concentrated effort to remove condemned homes from the 
study area and to consolidate some parcels, most notably for the Josie Heights Project, for 
which nearly four city blocks were cleared and consolidated for private development.  
The other statistic that is of some significance is the global Moran’s I for all three 
data sets. Global Moran’s I increases from 0.09 in 1995 to 0.37 by 2005, this, coupled 
with an increasing z-score for all three data sets, indicates that assessed home values per 
square foot are becoming more clustered over time. The other statistical consideration for 
these data sets is the frequency distribution. It was positively skewed for all three data 
sets, showing that the majority of the parcels have an assessed value per square foot of 
less than $10.00 (Table 4-1).  
 
Table 4-1 Assessed Value Per Square Foot: All Parcels 
  
Total 
 
 
Min. 
 
Max. 
 
Mean 
 
St. Dv. 
 
Moran’s I 
 
z-score 
 
pvalue 
1995 1810 $0.51 $62.52 $8.30 5.204 0.09 15.91 0.00 
2000 1640 $0.84 $64.95 $13.09 19.88 0.24 40.07 0.00 
2005 1769 $1.20 $99.98 $25.24 19.82 0.37 52.69 0.00 
(Source: City of Milwaukee MPROP Data; Author’s Analysis) 
 
When all parcels are compared to parcels with homes built after 1995, very 
distinctive trends develop. The data for parcels built after 1995 shows that the minimum 
assessed value of homes went down dramatically between 2000 and 2005, while the 
maximum value increased. The former statistic may be the result of a home that is under 
construction being assessed before it is complete, or it could signify an increase in 
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foreclosure rates. Again, Global Moran’s I calculations show an interesting trend. Global 
Moran’s I goes down from 0.37 to 0.17 between 2000 and 2005. While this still indicates 
a high degree of clustering it would seem to support the idea that the new homes being 
built are less clustered (Table 4-2). 
 
Table 4-2: Assessed Value Per Square Foot, Homes Built 1995-2005 
  
Total  
 
 
Min. 
 
 
Max. 
 
Mean 
 
St. Dv. 
 
Moran’s I 
 
z-score 
 
pvalue 
2000 42 $36.33 $64.95 $50.63 8.55 0.37 6.11 0.00 
2005 156 $1.20 $99.94 $80.80 14.66 0.17 7.46 0.00 
(Source: City of Milwaukee MPROP Data; Author’s Analysis) 
 
A calculation of assessed value for the three data sets showed a total assessed 
value for all residential properties in Lindsay Heights in 1995 of $33,719,660. By 2000, 
in spite of there being 170 fewer homes, the value had increased to $38,756,300. By 
2005, with the addition of 156 new homes, the assessed value had jumped to 
$86,076,855. This is an increase in assessed value of $47,320,555. The total value just of 
the homes built after 1995 amounts to $23,357,355. The resulting figures indicate that the 
new homes constructed between 1995 and 2005 had an average assessed value of 
$149,727 per home. These numbers indicate that the remaining $23,963,200 (over half of 
all increases measured) are the result of increases in the assessed value of the 
approximately 1600 already existing homes in Lindsay Heights. Considering the rather 
low increase of $5,036,640 in overall assessed value between 1995 and 2000 (while 
considering a net loss of 170 homes), it seems that new home placement within Lindsay 
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Heights may have had a strong influence on the assessed value of existing properties 
within the study area. 
When analyzing only homes built after 1995 for value per square foot the 
statistics indicate that the 156 homes built had a minimum value per square foot of $1.20, 
a maximum value of $99.98 and a mean of $80.80 with a frequency distribution that was 
quite negatively skewed. These figures would indicate that while there is new 
development in the study area this new development is providing homes at a price level 
quite different than what is otherwise available. 
Finally, I generated Getis-Ord Gi* maps to try to establish where high and low 
assessed value per square foot homes were clustered. I used a Getis-Ord Gi* map 
generated from the 1995 data set as a baseline to compare how clustering may have 
changed as a result of the redevelopment project. The 1995 map shows clustering of 
higher value parcels in the north-west portion of the study area and clustering of lower 
value parcels in the south-west part of the study area (Figure 4-2). A Getis-Ord Gi*map 
for all residential parcels from the 2005 data set show significant clustering of low value 
parcels across the northern part of the study area and a clustering of high value parcels 
across the southern portion of the study area (Figure 4-3). A third Getis-Ord Gi* map was 
generated using 2005 data but with all the parcels that had been built on since 1995 
removed. This map was generated to try to display what assessed value per square foot 
might look like if no redevelopment had taken place. This map clearly shows a cluster of 
high value parcels in the middle and at the extreme south edge of the study area with 
concentrations of low value parcels found in the north-west and south-central portions of 
the study area (Figure 4-4).
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Figure 4-2: Lindsay Heights Map Showing Getis-Ord Gi* for 1995 Parcels (Source: City of 
Milwaukee M-PROP Data; Author’s Analysis) 
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Figure 4-3: Lindsay Heights Map Showing Getis-Ord Gi* for All Parcels (Source: City of Milwaukee 
M-PROP Data; Author’s Analysis)
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Figure 4-4: Lindsay Heights Map Showing Getis-Ord Gi* for 1880-1995 Parcels  
(Source: City of Milwaukee M-PROP Data; Author’s Analysis)
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Conclusions 
 
It seems rather clear that the new development that is taking place in Lindsay 
Heights has had a positive effect for the city of Milwaukee.  The new homes have been 
located on parcels that were already zoned for housing which means that their presence 
has increased the local tax base significantly. The $23,357,533 of assessed value for the 
156 new homes means that less than 10% of the homes in the study area are currently 
generating over one quarter of the over-all assessed value of the entire study area (1769 
parcels). 
The results of the regression analysis appear significant; however, the dramatic 
shift in Beta is troublesome. This shift may be the result of other factors such as number 
of bedrooms or number of baths taking on more significance when assessing value. 
Unfortunately, because these are string variables in the data set they could not be factors 
in the regression analysis. One likely hypothesis is that the new homes being built in 
Lindsay Heights, while maintaining a similar square-footage as the existing home stock 
in the neighborhood, had a much higher assessed value. Therefore, while lot size 
remained constant, the new homes were displaying a much higher value per square foot 
when compared to the existing homes. Other factors that may have had an impact on the 
regression analysis could be inflated property values as the result of the housing bubble 
(which had not burst yet).  
The results of global Moran’s I indicate increased clustering of homes of a similar 
value over time when all parcels are considered but a decrease when only new homes are 
considered. Perhaps the most interesting result comes from the Getis-Ord Gi* maps. The 
maps show a clear shift in the location of high assessed value homes since the start of the 
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redevelopment project. This shift is made all the more clear when compared to Figure 4-
1. What is perhaps most interesting is the increase in high value assessments that seem to 
be located in the area that received the most intense redevelopment. This may be the 
strongest indicator that current redevelopment is affecting existing home values. This 
could have positive effects on the neighborhood; however, a dramatic increase could 
result in the displacement of current residents. 
The purpose of this statistical analysis was to try to ascertain, through the data and 
programs available, if there were indications that the Lindsay Heights Redevelopment 
Project was affecting property values of existing homes within the study area, and if so, 
was that effect significant. While the results of the analysis have proved to be 
informative, there are several areas of this statistical analysis that would benefit from 
further research. One approach that might generate more accurate results would be to 
isolate the parcels with new homes on them and create a buffer around those homes. This 
would allow the researcher to concentrate on the existing homes in the immediate vicinity 
of new construction. This might allow for a more accurate assessment of how 
redevelopment is affecting home values in the study area. Another approach would be to 
isolate homeowners’ names from the data set in an effort to confirm whether they are the 
owner-occupant of the parcel, and determine whether there has been a high turnover rate 
in the study area. This may give an indication of whether or not displacement is occurring 
and, if it is, at what rate.  
These considerations led me to conclude that a more fine-grained analysis of 
isolated block fronts would result in a fuller understanding of how, and to what degree, 
redevelopment has altered the existing neighborhood known as Lindsay Heights.  
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Chapter 5: Lindsay Heights Project Houses in the Neighborhood 
Block Level Analysis 
When evaluating the impact of the new construction and renovations associated 
with the Lindsay Heights project, one must acknowledge that it adds housing 
improvements of 165 new and 221 renovated units in an area of 2522 units prior to the 
beginning of its activity (Figure 3-6). When considering a comparison to the number of 
units in 1940, a time associated with its relatively stable working-class neighborhood of 
6283 houses (Figure 3-1), the impact of 386 units hardly corrects for the loss. Keeping in 
mind its incremental addition to the neighborhood’s overall inventory, we might also 
acknowledge that despite its “scatter site” approach the new homes are not being built in 
all areas of the neighborhood. Field observation and City of Milwaukee property data 
have shown a pattern of high redevelopment in the southwest portion of Lindsay Heights, 
with less redevelopment occurring in the north and northwest portions of the 
neighborhood. This points to uneven development within the project boundaries, or a 
limitation to just how “scattered” the infill is. Field research indicates that this is the 
result of some block groups experiencing much more clustered redevelopment. 
Based on the findings from the analysis of the data from the previous chapter, and 
this pattern of development that at times defies the definition of scattered, I believe that a 
more fine-grained analysis of the neighborhood is warranted in order to understand the 
impact of new construction in Lindsay Heights. To perform this analysis I identified four 
blocks to study: three sample blocks and one control (Figure 5-1). All four blocks consist 
of the housing stock located on a single city block where the homes face each other and 
share a common street. These “face front” blocks were selected based on criteria that will 
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give some insight into how new construction has affected the community. The criteria for 
establishing the three study blocks relied on visual inspection of the face front blocks to 
establish blocks that had a mixture of homes (new, pre-existing and refurbished). The 
control block was chosen for its lack of new or refurbished homes as well as its low 
number of empty lots. This chapter will provide a quantitative analysis of these blocks to 
evaluate the affects that the Lindsay Heights Redevelopment Project has had on the 
community.
 1
 
Once the study blocks had been established I performed statistical analysis of the 
properties using MPROP data from the city of Milwaukee. I collected the MPROP data 
for the study areas for 1995 (the first year of the project), 2000, 2005 and 2010. The 
primary data consisted of build year, square footage, assessed value, owner-occupancy, 
and the tenure of the owner of the home. This data should indicate whether the 
construction of new homes on these blocks has had a positive or negative affect on home 
values in the community, and to what extent. 
                                                 
1
 The criteria for establishing the three study blocks relied on visual inspection of the face front 
blocks to establish blocks that had a mixture of homes (new, pre-existing and refurbished). The 
control block was chosen for its lack of new or refurbished homes as well as its low number of 
empty lots. This chapter will provide a quantitative analysis of these blocks to evaluate the affects 
that the Lindsay Heights Redevelopment Project has had on the community. 
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 Figure 5-1: Map Showing Sample Block Groups and Control Group (Source: Google Maps) 
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Group A is located on the 1700 block of W. Wright St. within the Phillis Wheatley 
Neighborhood. Group B is located on the 1900 block of N. 18
th
 St. in the Johnson Park 
Neighborhood. Group C is located on the 1900 block of N. 15
th
 St. in the Walnut Way 
Neighborhood, and the Control Group is located on the 2500 block of N. 16
th
 St., which 
straddles the Phillis Wheatley neighborhood to the west and the Clarke Street 
Neighborhood to the east. All these neighborhoods are contained within the Lindsay 
Heights redevelopment area (Figure 5-1). 
 
Assessed Values 
I compared assessed values in the three study areas with the control group to 
determine whether the construction of new homes affected the values of the existing 
homes on the block. It is often complicated to apply assessed value data to case studies 
because they do not exist in a vacuum. Market forces, deterioration, rehabilitation and the 
sale of the home are just a few of the factors that can impact assessed value. For the 
purposes of this evaluation it will be assumed that the various complicating factors have 
had an equal impact on the homes in the study area, and consideration for measurable 
factors will be noted. Another complicating factor is determining what an increase in 
assessed value does to neighborhood stability. It can be argued that increases positively 
affect homeowners by increasing the equity in their homes; however large increases in 
assessed value often result in large increases in tax assessments, which low-income or 
fixed-income residents may not be able to afford, and might result in their displacement. 
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When analyzing the assessed value data for the case study areas there are a few 
trends that stand out. It is rather easy to categorize the data into two groups, 1995-2000 
and 2005-2010. The reason for this is two-fold. First, when evaluating groups A, B and 
C, 14 of the 16 new homes were constructed after 2000. This creates a rather abrupt line 
of delineation in the construction record with existing homes residing in the pre-2005 
data set and almost all of the new construction happening after 2000. The second, and 
perhaps more important, trend is the dramatic increase in assessed value for all of the 
homes, in all four groups, between 2000 and 2005. With the exception of a few increases, 
between 1995 and 2000 assessed values remained rather constant. However, between 
2000 and 2005 the value of the properties in all four groups increased by an average of 
263.24%. When comparing the assessed values of all the homes in all four groups, the 
values are nearly identical in 2005 and 2010.  
For group A, the average assessed value for 1995 was $17,325. In 2000 it 
increased slightly to $17,550. In 2005 that average jumped to $107,683 and by 2010 it 
had increased to $107,750. Group B had an average assessed value of $10,244 in 1995; 
by 2000 it had increased to $16,980. In 2005 group B’s average had gone up to $87,806 
and by 2010 average values had increased to $87,912. The average assessed value of 
group C was $7,883 in 1995; in 2000 it had more than doubled to $16,514, primarily due 
to the construction of a home in 1999 that had an assessed value of over $50,000. By 
2005 the average had leaped to $83,711 and remained the same in 2010. The control 
group had an average assessed value of $25,000 in 1995; by 2000 it had increased to 
$38,000. In 2005 the average reached $87,200 and remained the same in 2010. 
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When trying to reconcile how such an abrupt leap in assessed value can happen in 
such a short time period two causes come to mind. The first is the housing bubble, which 
in 2005 had yet to burst. This variable would be difficult to quantify and should affect all 
of the homes in the study area fairly similarly. Taking into account city-wide increases in 
assessed home values during these same years provides, at least, some context for 
comparison. The second variable is home resale. One of the quickest ways for a home to 
increase in assessed value is through sale. If a homeowner has owned or lived in a home 
for a number of years the home’s assessed value is often predicated on the price of the 
home when it was purchased. Therefore, residents with a long tenure in a particular 
community may have an assessed value for their home that is well below market value. 
However, if they sell their home assessed value can jump dramatically. 
Fortunately, this case study allowed me to make comparisons between homes that 
had been sold between 2000 and 2005 and those whose owners had remained constant 
throughout the 15 year analysis. The data indicates that the average increase in value for 
homes that had been sold between 2000 and 2005 was 265.69%, while the average 
increase in value for homes with a constant owner throughout the study period was 
255.25%. The small difference between homes that changed ownership and those that did 
not suggests that home sales were not a significant factor in the massive increase in home 
values between 2000 and 2005. 
Average assessed value for the four groups must also be considered to try to 
establish whether or not new home construction has affected the value of existing homes 
in the community. In 1995 the assessed values of the homes in all four groups were rather 
varied, with a maximum of $17,325 (group A) and a minimum of $7883 (group C), with 
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the control group averaging at $15,180. Over the 15 year study period group A saw an 
average increase in value of 320%, group B saw an average increase of 255%, group C 
increased its value by 277%, and the control group recorded an average increase of 199% 
(Tables 5-1 through 5-4). While all of these increases are rather significant, groups A, B 
and C obviously saw increases much greater than that of the control group. These 
numbers seem even more remarkable when you consider that the median home value in 
the city as a whole increased 49.5% between 2000 and 2005 (Johnson and Derus 2006). 
While this number is certainly not insignificant, it is far below that of even the control 
group. This might suggest that even blocks which have had no development may be 
benefiting from the new construction that has taken place elsewhere in Lindsay Heights. 
These large increases in assessed value suggest that the neighborhood has improved, that 
homeowners have increased equity and the city’s tax base is expanding. But have these 
increases displaced existing residents? Has this shift to much higher home values 
alleviated the existing economic and social issues in the neighborhood? 
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Table 5-1: Study Group A Assessed Values 1995-2010 
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Table 5-2: Study Group B Assessed Values 1995-2010 
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Table 5-3: Study Group C Assessed Values 1995-2010 
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Table 5-4: Control Group Assessed Values 1995-2010 
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Owner-Occupancy Data 
One common measure of neighborhood stability is owner-occupancy. Many 
people believe that if a neighborhood has a high level of owner-occupants it engenders a 
sense of community and pride that is lacking in neighborhoods with a high turnover rate 
or a high number of renters. In 1995 block group A had an owner-occupancy rate of 
44.4%, with three of the eight homes being owner-occupied (Table 5-5). By 2000 the 
percentage had risen to 50%. In spite of the number of homes in group A increasing by 
six between 2000 and 2010, the percentage of owner-occupants only rose to 66.7%. 
Block group B has a more complicated narrative due to some inconsistencies in the data 
as well as a more vigorous sales market. The data indicates that owner-occupancy and 
tenure were much more volatile in this block group, with only four of the 17 homes 
retaining their original owner for the entire study period (Table 5-6). However, unlike 
group A, group B’s owner-occupancy rate had reached 83.33% by 2000 and held firm at 
82.35% in 2005 and 2010. Block group C consisted of six existing structures in 1995, of 
which only two were owner-occupied (Table 5-7). By 2000 homes and owner-occupancy 
had increased by one, raising the percentage of owner-occupied homes in the block group 
to 42.86%. With the addition of two new homes and three new occupants by 2005, the 
percentage of owner-occupied homes in group C rose to 66.67% in 2005 and remained 
constant in 2010. In 1995 the control block had an owner-occupancy rate of 46.67%; by 
2000 the rate had fallen slightly to 43.75%. In 2005 the percentage had returned to 
46.67%, but by 2010 it had fallen to 40%.  
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Table 5-5: Group A Owner Occupancy 1995-2010 
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Table 5-6: Group B Owner Occupancy 1995-2010 
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Table 5-7: Group C Owner Occupancy 1995-2010 
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Table 5-8: Control Group Owner Occupancy 1995-2010 
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This data indicates that block groups A, B and C all either maintained or increased 
their owner-occupancy rates over the course of the 15 year study, while the control group 
ultimately had fewer owner-occupants at the end of the study period (Table 5-8). An 
obvious contributing factor to the increases experienced by block groups A and C is the 
fact that most of the people that purchased/constructed the new homes on the blocks have 
maintained their owner-occupied status, while a handful of homes in the control group 
have gone from private ownership to that of a property management company or a bank. 
Overall, this data suggests that new construction appears to have a stabilizing impact on 
owner-occupancy rates in the study area. 
 
Tenure 
In addition to owner-occupancy, another stabilizing factor in neighborhoods can be 
measured by the tenure of the residents in a given community. For example, in block 
group A, of the eight homes that were built between 1893 and 1914, only three (38%) 
maintained ownership by the same individual throughout the 15 years of the case study. 
In group B, of the 13 homes that existed in 1995, only four (31%) maintained consistent 
ownership over the course of the study period. For group C it was two of six existing 
homes (33%), while in the control group, of the 17 homes listed, six (35%) maintained 
consistent ownership. These percentages do not indicate a major difference in tenure 
between blocks that experienced significant redevelopment and the one that did not. 
In Group A the remaining homes have changed hands at some point during the 
study period. In most cases, the homes changed hands between 2000 and 2005. This 
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holds true for groups B, C, and the control group. So while tenure is sporadic, it does 
appear to maintain itself within a decade-long period. The data indicates that even when 
they do change hands, tenure lasts for at least 10 years. 
Because of the burst of the housing bubble one of the most interesting things about 
the data is that when analyzing the new homes that have been built in block groups A, B, 
and C, none of them have been sold since they were constructed, with the exception of 
one home in group C that is now owned by DeutscheBank. Out of the 16 new homes 
represented in the three block groups, only one is not owned by the original owner. 
Given the City of Milwaukee’s housing bubble, many homeowners across the 
county have avoided selling their homes because market value may have dropped. 
However, the apparently minimal occurrence of foreclosure (on new homes) in these 
study groups indicates that the individuals or groups that oversaw the financing of this 
new construction did their job. Given the City of Milwaukee’s commitment to the New 
Urbanist principle of conformity to local architectural styles, questions might be raised 
regarding to the “fit” of these new homes within the context of the neighborhood. How 
well do the new Lindsay Heights properties respond to “place” concerns?  
 
Architectural Continuity of Size in New Construction 
Two factors are important when it comes to architectural continuity: aesthetic 
consistency and relative consistency of size. The types of existing structures within 
Lindsay Heights tended to be Worker’s Cottages or duplexes. However, when 
introducing scattered infill into the project area, single-family homes were the primary 
objective. Yet twenty-first century home-buyers are apt to want certain amenities that 
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simply aren’t available in the cottages built between 1880 and 1915. New homeowners 
expect more square footage, open floor plans and different facilities, such as more 
bathrooms or larger closets or kitchens. Therefore, some sort of compromise had to be 
managed between the conventional size of the homes in the area and the optimal size of 
new homes. Cottages were too small; duplexes were too large. 
Therefore, it is important to look at the square footage of the new homes that were 
built in the three study groups and compare it to the square footage of existing homes and 
the control group homes. The data indicates that in block group A, the new construction 
of single-family homes was actually below the average size of existing homes. It is 
noteworthy that many of the existing structures in group A were duplexes, while the new 
homes were all single-family homes. Group B is somewhat different, as it has the largest 
variation in square footage for existing homes, ranging from 878 square feet to 2348 
square feet. The new construction in this block group was between 1536 and 2086 square 
feet. This indicates that the new construction stayed within the parameters of existing 
home stock square footage, however it must be pointed out that, as with most of the new 
construction in Lindsay Heights, while the mass of the structure was within the 
parameters of existing home stock their purposes were quite different. Many of the 
existing homes of that size were duplexes (see Figure 5-2). The new construction in these 
areas that is of a similar size is primarily single family homes (see Figure 5-3). 
Block group C had the smallest average square footage in existing homes; 
however, the new homes were well within those parameters and tended to attempt to 
evoke a “modern bungalow” style – but with a square footage that was 500-600 square 
feet larger than existing “bungalow” cottages. 
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Architectural Continuity of Appearance in New Construction 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Figure 5-3 also demonstrates the ways some 
new homes have gone beyond the simpler architecture of the older homes, including 
features that are not so much consistent with the actual simple architecture of the original 
building period in the area but may reflect a nostalgic or romanticized notion of what old 
homes in general are supposed to look like. Interestingly, these features, such as such as 
divided windows, a wrap-around porch, and faux shutters, in some ways reflect 
architectural patterns more commonly found in rural or small town communities rather 
than in densely packed urban areas—where a wraparound porch would likely butt against 
a neighbor’s wall or alley. 
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Figure 5-2: Existing Duplex in Group A Study Area (Source: Author) 
 
 
 
Figure 5-3: New Home in Group A Study Area (Source: Author) 
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Figure 5-4: New Bungalow in Group C Study Area (Source: Author) 
 
 
Figure 5-5 Existing Worker’s Cottage in Group C Study Area (Source: Author) 
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Figure 5-4 exemplifies new construction that mimics a traditional one-and-a-half 
story bungalow with a reasonably steep roofline with dormers, and a full, covered front 
porch. In contrast, an existing worker’s cottage located two doors down (Figure 5-5) 
shares some of the general architectural attributes of the new construction but is in fact 
lacking some of the very elements the City of Milwaukee required of new construction – 
a large, covered front porch, or a steeper pitched roof. 
Sometimes, they missed the continuity mark completely (Figure 5-6). However, 
the fact that this home stands out as an exception does demonstrate the extent to which 
the City’s emphasis on architectural continuity was successful. 
 
Figure 5-6: New Home in Group C Study Area (Source: Author) 
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Rehabilitation 
It is more difficult to track renovations done to existing homes, but visual 
inspection of these block groups does reveal obvious significant home improvements to 
certain homes. Block group A has two existing structures that have had rehabilitation. 
One home (#1718) had vinyl siding installed, a modern roof shingle installed, and a high 
efficiency furnace. The other structure (#1727) had vinyl siding and a modern roof 
shingle installed. In group B two existing structures were rehabilitated. One (#1947) 
received vinyl siding, while another (#1906) received vinyl siding, modern roof shingles, 
and a high efficiency furnace. For group C, four of the six existing structures had some 
rehabilitation. #1932 (Figure 5-7) and #1959 received new vinyl siding; #1942 and #1947 
received vinyl siding, modern roof shingles, and a high efficiency furnace. In the control 
group, three homes: #2523 and 2538 both received new vinyl siding, while #2564 
received new vinyl siding and a high efficiency furnace. 
 
Figure 5-7: Existing Worker’s Cottage from Group C that Underwent Rehabilitation 
Source: Author 
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Conclusion 
Based on the analysis of select block groups in the Lindsay Heights redevelopment 
area, it is clear that the “scattered site” infill was not all that scattered, which indicates 
uneven development within the project area. Property values for all the parcels that were 
analyzed displayed dramatic increases when compared to the city of Milwaukee as a 
whole, especially between 2000 and 2005. However, property values in the control group 
increased at a significantly lower rate than the other study block groups. 
The analysis shows that the project has led to stability within the project area; all of 
the new homes remain owner-occupied. Groups A, B, and C all showed an increase in 
occupancy rates during the project, while the control group occupancy rates fell 
consistently during the years analyzed. In addition to owner-occupancy rates, tenure 
within all of the study groups was strong; however, it is difficult to determine whether 
part of that could be due to the real estate bubble bursting, which may have left 
homeowners unable to sell their homes. 
While a decent attempt was made with regard to architectural continuity, it is clear 
from field observations that often the size of a newly constructed single-family home is 
similar to that of a pre-existing duplex. In addition, the new “bungalows” were often 
substantially larger than the worker’s cottages located nearby. So while there is some 
measure of continuity in the architecture, that continuity was perhaps compromised for 
the sake of consumer desires. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Overview 
Given the neighborhood’s poverty statistics in 1994, WHEDA selected Lindsay 
Heights as the focus of its development efforts and launched a renovation and house 
construction agenda. According to WHEDA, the primary goals of the Lindsay Heights 
redevelopment project were to beautify the neighborhood, promote neighborhood 
stability and pride, create scattered infill, spur investment, increase the Milwaukee tax 
base, and create a more mixed-income community (WHEDA 2009). These initiatives 
were also designed to promote owner-occupancy of the newly constructed homes and to 
inspire existing homeowners to make further improvements to their homes and 
neighborhood as a whole. 
As the previous chapters indicate, the project does seem to have had some 
measurable success in these goals. Property values did go up disproportionately; the tax 
base increased; and 165 vacant sites were filled. By introducing new construction to 
neighborhoods whose existing housing stock was built mostly around 1900, developers 
virtually guaranteed that the neighborhoods where these new homes were built would be 
mixed-income, due to the drastic differences in home value between new and existing 
homes. The increase in tax base stemming from new homes, therefore, was probably at 
least somewhat predictable; however, the increase in tax base from neighboring homes 
was less of a sure thing. It seems clear, based on the findings from Chapter 5, that the 
new housing stock increased the value of existing homes. 
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New Urbanist Goals 
The redevelopment project also appears to have honored several of the principles 
of New Urbanism, such as the emphasis on reinforcing the architectural and historical 
flavor of the area. A few other principles in particular are worth noting in connection with 
the data collected here.  Principle Four of the New Urbanism charter promotes infill 
development to help curtail urban sprawl (Grimshaw 2000). Infill of urban areas can 
certainly help to reduce sprawl, but it also has other benefits. Infill is an environmentally 
sound practice. Because it utilizes land that has already been given over to development, 
it can save arable land or green space at the periphery of an urban area. If this infill 
results in mixed use neighborhoods it can reduce commuting between city and suburbs, 
thereby reducing strains on the environment, infrastructure, and help to lessen the effects 
of spatial mismatch. Infill also has economic benefits, such as increased tax base and 
potential investment in the community by small businesses, which can bring both jobs 
and retail outlets. Breaking the cycle of disinvestment in urban areas and curtailing 
sprawl are but a few of the tenants at the core of New Urbanist ideals (Robbins 2004).  
Principle Thirteen of the charter calls for neighborhoods to contain a broad range 
of housing types at various price levels. By providing different housing options it is 
believed that neighborhoods will be more diverse, both socially and economically. 
Ideally this diversity would not just be represented by mixed income but also by people 
of different cultures and ages coming together to form a community. The wide range of 
home values demonstrated in this study at least demonstrates a degree of mixed wealth, 
which likely—at this level of home price—indicates a mix of incomes. 
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The ideal of branding and community pride is also evident in the Lindsay Heights 
project – even if it was dependent on a narrative of the market, and market-driven 
development defining success (Pabst 2008). As faulty as that narrative has proven to be 
in the recent past, with the real estate market bubble’s burst, the very act of naming this 
part of the city creates an opportunity for residents to feel membership and ownership, 
and ideally, pride. A number of recent initiatives such as community gardens and 
community associations (albeit separate from the WHEDA public/private partnership) 
both demonstrate and promote increased enthusiasm among residents for their 
neighborhood. The Zilber Neighborhood Initiative has even created a map of the 
neighborhood that, with its cartoon icons, resembles the maps for tourist attractions or 
theme parks and highlights such distinctive neighborhood establishments such as “Coffee 
Makes You Black” and “Heart of the Neighborhood” (Figure 6-1). 
The market-driven construction that was praised when launching the Zilber 
Neighborhood Initiative failed to take off with the recent stagnation of the real estate 
market. Now, however, that there are signs of some recovery. Will the activity resume?  
The Josey Heights subdivision is being promoted without any hint of its recent stagnation 
– and notice of the “opportunity” of purchasing a new home is posted on the district 
alderman’s web site.  As indicated at that site, Alderman Hines notes that the promise is: 
This project could result in an estimated $10 million in additional tax base to the 
neighborhood. There is a demand in the central city for market-driven housing at 
all prices and income ranges, and Josey Heights will build on the success of the 
Lindsay Heights homes and provide more economic stability for the area. 
(Hines 2006) 
 
Neighborhood residents acknowledge the challenges to their neighborhood in terms of 
the health of the real estate market. The Lindsay Heights “Quality of Life Plan” notes a  
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Figure 6-1: Zilber Neighborhood Initiative Map of Lindsay Heights (Source: znimilwaukee.org) 
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six percent foreclosure rate for the neighborhood in 2008 as compared to a two percent 
rate for the country as a whole (Zilber 2013). The entrepreneurial tone of the city, 
WHEDA, and even – at times – the neighborhood, reflects the contemporary form of 
governance.  Being hesitant to engage in undue cynicism, the positive tone associated 
with any form of boosterism and/or promotion does not guarantee success but may be 
required for success in reviving a flagging local economy. 
 
Sustainability 
Manufactured housing seems to be a good solution for scattered site infill for the 
reasons described in previous chapters, but it also has a down side. Historically, 
manufactured housing has had lower rates of appreciation than site-built housing 
depending on how it is titled and where it is located. Moreover, housing construction is 
one of the last industries that are truly local. While it is true that the material to construct 
site-built homes is often shipped in from great distances, the assembly of those materials 
is typically done on site by skilled or semi-skilled workers who are often either from the 
city where they are working or from somewhere nearby. This type of home construction 
has been a critical part of many local economies and is often considered an important 
indicator of economic well-being. Manufactured housing can strip localities of this flow 
of capital. Not only are the homes built elsewhere, but the specialized equipment and 
techniques required to assemble them often means that the assembly is done by non-
locals as well. In this sense, competition for resources to quickly create affordable infill 
housing can result in a short-term win for some home-owners but a long-term drawback 
to the larger economic health of a city. 
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Addressing the Underlying Problems that Caused the Neighborhood’s Decline 
Measuring the success of the redevelopment project in terms of its own stated 
goals can make it easy to overlook important outcomes that the project never set out to 
achieve in the first place. While it was a study on poverty that sparked the project, 
virtually no aspect of the redevelopment project has directly addressed the root causes of 
that poverty. A different plan might have focused on job or job-training programs, on 
improvements to schools or affordable daycare, or on attracting commercial ventures that 
might provide jobs to which these residents, according to New Urbanist principles, could 
walk. While an increase in home equity can be a tremendous positive for some home-
owners (provided they can afford increased property taxes), the poorest residents are 
more likely to be renters. WHEDA’s emphasis on beautifying the neighborhood might 
not just mask the poverty behind the facades, but actually displace the impoverished, 
moving the problem around and making it harder to track, rather than solving it. 
Despite the general American emphasis on the importance of home-ownership 
and self-reliance, as Ghose has noted (2005), building homes is not a panacea. In Lindsay 
Heights, the new homes, with their much higher assessed values, may have the effect of 
skewing the demographics so that the census tracts do not look so impoverished. The 
changes in census tracts in 2010 will also make it more difficult to track the economic 
health of area residents, because Lindsay Heights is now spread out over nine census 
tracts, and not a single one of them contains a significant portion of Lindsay Heights. 
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Conclusion 
I have attempted to show how the redevelopment of Milwaukee’s Lindsay 
Heights neighborhood is the result of a particular form of neoliberalism that manifests 
itself through slightly nuanced neoliberal processes such as quasi-public-private 
partnerships as well as specific branding of the city that embraces working class values 
and New Urbanist development philosophies. The branding of the city as a “genuine 
American city” and the promotion of New Urbanist ideology allowed city leaders to trade 
on Milwaukee’s working class heritage to create a sense of place that promoted hard 
work and perseverance over government handouts. That the public-private partnership 
launched by WHEDA addressed the needs of a low-income neighborhood at least went 
beyond the prevalent form of entrepreneurial governance that had promoted the 
Downtown’s redevelopment as a means of bringing the middle-class back into the city as 
consumers or residents (Kenny & Zimmerman 2003). 
There is still much to be done in order to better understand how Milwaukee’s 
neoliberal policies are shaping the urban environment in general and the Lindsay Heights 
redevelopment project in particular. Having a better understanding of who is moving to 
Lindsay Heights may provide further insight into how policy is shaping the city. Is the 
call of New Urbanism really enticing suburbanites back to the city? How do these new 
residents feel about their new environment? How do the city of Milwaukee and WHEDA 
perceive the success of the project? Answers to these questions may provide better 
insight about where the redevelopment project is headed in the future. 
It would appear that the entrepreneurial role of the city in the Lindsay Heights 
redevelopment project is quite different from traditional roles the city often takes. 
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WHEDA, along with some local residents of Lindsay Heights, deserve a great deal of 
credit for the success of the project.  Part of that success appears to be the result of 
WHEDA stepping outside of its traditional roles as in overseer of mortgage lending and 
becoming more involved in the entrepreneurial aspects of development.  
There are also other issues remaining that should be addressed. The Lindsay 
Heights redevelopment project represents a winner in the battle for funds, but Lindsay 
Heights represents only a small portion of the economically depressed communities in 
Milwaukee who did not win. And while the numbers indicate that the Lindsay Heights 
redevelopment project has been a success, there are still questions about whether or not 
these successes have addressed the underlying initial problem identified by Fannie Mae 
back in 1994. 
What is clear is that given the correct economic situation, redevelopment projects 
like Lindsay Heights can succeed. What remains to be established is whether or not these 
types of projects can bring lasting change to a community and address the socio-
economic problems that put such neighborhoods and their residents into such precarious 
positions in the first place. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Figure A-1: Lindsay Heights Census Tract Map 1940-1960 
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Figure A-2: Lindsay Heights Census Tract Map 1970-2000 
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Table A-1: 1940 Census Tract Data for Area that Becomes Lindsay Heights 
Census Tracts*
*
 27/118 28/117 37/102 38/101 50/86 51/85 
LH 
Consolidated 
City of 
Milwaukee 
Population Total 3186 3353 4560 3609 3676 3828 22212   
White 2454 2571 3406 2766 2971 3089 17257   
Black 0 0 1 0 0 0 1   
White Foreign Born 730 781 1153 843 705 739 4951   
Other 2 1 0   0 0 3   
                  
Median Income N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A   
% High School 
Graduates N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A   
% Below Poverty Line N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A   
                  
Housing                 
Total Stock 903 992 1245 984 1061 1098 6283   
Owner Occupied 229 185 307 289 361 348 1719   
Black                 
White                 
                  
Rental 653 720 923 676 681 734 4387   
Black                 
White                 
                  
Vacant Lots 21 37 15 19 18 16 126   
Median Home Value $ $3,032 $2,671 $3,376 $3,274 $3,504 $3,483 $3,223 $4,084 
              (avg. of medians)   
                                                 
*
 Census tract numbers changed in 1970. The number after the slash indicates the new number starting in 1970. 
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Table A-2: 1950 Census Tract Data for Area that Becomes Lindsay Heights 
Census Tracts* 27/118 28/117 37/102 38/101 50/86 51/85 
LH 
Consolidated 
City of 
Milwaukee 
Population Total 3135 3158 4380 3604 3425 3585 21287   
White 2680 2618 3531 3004 2972 3102 17907   
Black 23 102 81 2 2 17 227   
White Foreign Born 431 428 766 592 449 460 3126   
Other 1 10 2 6 2 6 27   
                  
Median Income $ 3324 2888 3180 3256 3731 3455 3305.67 3340 
                  
% High School 
Graduates N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A   
                  
% Below Poverty Line N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A   
                  
Housing                 
Total Stock 919 945 1275 1097 1108 1102 6446   
Owner Occupied 310 266 410 360 447 438 2231   
Black 3 9 10 0 0 5 27   
White 307 257 400 360 447 433 2204   
                  
Rental 603 700 867 727 635 646 4178   
Black 0 17 8 2 0 1 28   
White 603 683 859 725 635 645 4150   
                  
Vacant Lots 11 5 16 12 26 24 94   
Median Home Value $ $6,529 $6,316 $6,917 N/A $8,563 $8,102 $7,285 $11,086 
              (avg. of medians)   
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Table A-3: 1960 Census Tract Data for Area that Becomes Lindsay Heights 
Census Tracts* 27/118 28/117 37/102 38/101 50/86 51/85 
LH 
Consolidated 
City of 
Milwaukee 
Population Total 3066 2960 4234 3569 3503 3305 20637   
White 1093 646 898 1249 1584 1063 6533   
Black 1912 2308 3326 2344 1893 2211 13994   
Foreign Born 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Other 69 6 10 54 26 31 196   
                  
Median Income $ 4972 4477 4694 5516 5968 5385 5168.67 5694 
% High School 
Graduates N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A   
% Below Poverty Line N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A   
                  
Housing                 
Total Stock 827 914 1157 1010 1055 963 5926   
Owner Occupied 226 184 312 289 401 367 1779   
Black 78 87 170 133 133 176 777   
White 148 97 142 156 268 191 1002   
                  
Rental 567 649 792 670 592 547 3817   
Black 374 487 629 401 335 363 2589   
White 193 162 163 269 257 184 1228   
                  
Vacant Lots 34 81 130 51 62 49 407   
Median Home Value $8,500 $8,300 $8,200 $11,400 $8,600 $9,200 $9,033 $15,100 
              (avg. of medians)   
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Table A-4: 1970 Census Tract Data for Area that Becomes Lindsay Heights 
Census Tracts 27/118 28/117 37/102 38/101 50/86 51/85 
LH 
Consolidated 
City of 
Milwaukee 
Population Total 2028 1390 2599 2319 3495 2863 14694   
White 204 85 96 102 234 139 860   
Black 1812 1294 2497 2212 3257 2685 13757   
Foreign Born                 
Other 12 11 6 5 4 39 77   
                  
Median Income $ $5,952 $5,179 $3,619 $5,408 $8,100 $7,136 $5,899 $10,262 
              (avg. of means)   
% High School 
Graduates 25.7 22.2 16.3 23.4 30.1 25.6 23.88 49.2 
              (avg. of means)   
% Below Poverty Line 29.2 38.4 46.4 32.7 24.1 25.6 32.73 8.1 
Housing                 
Total Stock 616 423 785 749 1065 895 4533   
Owner Occupied 122 77 149 160 324 272 1104   
Black 79 50 130 131 267 231 888   
White 43 22 19 29 57 41 211   
                  
Rental 437 307 577 511 654 561 3047   
Black 397 291 551 481 611 531 2862   
White 40 16 26 30 43 30 185   
                  
Vacant Lots 58 48 66 85 109 86 452   
Median Home Value $ $6,400 $6,500 $7,700 $8,300 $8,700 $8,900 $7,750 $18,200 
              (avg. of means)   
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Table A-5: 1980 Census Tract Data for Area that Becomes Lindsay Heights 
Census Tracts 27/118 28/117 37/102 38/101 50/86 51/85 
LH 
Consolidated 
City of 
Milwaukee 
Population Total 1179 604 1648 1648 2733 2246 10058   
White  (White population did not meet the 400-person threshold to be counted by census.)   
Black 1086 577 1602 1603 2660 2182 9710   
Foreign Born                 
Other                 
Non-Black 93 27 46 45 73 64 348   
                  
Median Income $ $7,102 $7,292 $8,052 $9,384 $9,614 $8,904 $8,391 $16,028 
              (avg. of means)   
% High School Graduates 27.6 46.6 28.3 42.4 37.7 34.6 36.2 63.6 
              (avg. of means)   
% Below Poverty Line 28 48.6 37.5 37.7 39 30.5 36.88 11.2 
              (avg. of means)   
Housing                 
Total Stock 373 228 605 552 886 832 3476   
Owner Occupied 76 39 104 147 266 238 870   
Black 64 37 99 134 251 222 807   
White 12 2 5 13 15 16 63   
                  
Rental 242 158 414 335 513 512 2174   
Black 230 149 401 325 508 502 2115   
White 12 9 13 10 5 10 59   
                  
Vacant Lots 44 29 84 65 102 77 401   
Median Home Value $ $11,100 $15,000 $14,400 $17,400 $17,700 $16,100 $15,283 $45,500 
              (avg. of means)   
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Table A-6: 1990 Census Tract Data for Area that Becomes Lindsay Heights 
Census Tracts 27/118 28/117 37/102 38/101 50/86 51/85 
LH 
Consolidated City of Milwaukee 
Population Total 1039 504 1355 1440 2395 1906 8639   
White  (White population did not meet the 400-person threshold to be counted by census.)   
Black 993 499 1330 1411 2342 1873 8448   
Foreign Born                 
Other                 
Non-Black 46 5 25 29 53 33 191   
                  
Median Income $ $13,417 $9,392 $9,709 $12,306 $12,041 $9,607 $11,079 $32,359 
              (avg. of means)   
% High School 
Graduates 43 46.8 42 35 38.6 50.7 42.68 79.7 
              (avg. of means)   
% Below Poverty Line 54.2 57.9 59.9 61.1 48 49.2 55.05 11.5 
              (avg. of means)   
Housing                 
Total Stock 270 174 420 397 652 609 2522   
Owner Occupied 83 26 90 107 181 185 672   
Black                 
White                 
                  
Rental 187 148 330 290 471 424 1850   
Black                 
White                 
                  
Vacant Lots           N/A     
Median Home Value $ $23,800 $17,900 $21,100 $25,000 $23,300 $23,700 $22,467 $76,600 
              (avg. of means)   
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Table A-7: 2000 Census Tract Data for Area that Becomes Lindsay Heights 
Census Tracts 27/118 28/117 37/102 38/101 50/86 51/85 
LH 
Consolidated 
City of 
Milwaukee 
Population Total 639 436 880 1158 1651 1590 6354   
White 24 7 15 36 20 61 163   
Black 552 396 842 1072 1608 1474 5944   
Foreign Born                 
Other                 
Non-Black 46 25 1 14 2 18 106   
                  
Median Income $ $8,667 $1,071 $6,251 $2,478 $4,073 $7,361 $4,984 $16,028 
              (avg. of means)   
% High School 
Graduates 18.9 30.7 25.7 39.3 29.9 37.6 30.35 63.6 
              (avg. of means)   
% Below Poverty Line 17.2 40.7 46.7 36.8 46.4 46.4 39.03 11.2 
              (avg. of means)   
Housing                 
Total Stock 242 151 406 327 590 586 2302   
Owner Occupied 91 24 72 90 161 170 608   
Black N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A   
White N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A   
                  
Rental 242 158 414 335 513 512 2174   
Black N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A   
White N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A   
                  
Vacant Lots 39 7 78 54 82 71 331   
Median Home Value $ $48,200 $65,000 $19,400 $53,800 $31,000 $23,600 $40,167 $45,500 
              (avg. of means)   
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APPENDIX B 
1995 parcels 
 
Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
d
i
m
e
n
s
i
o
n
0 
1 Value_SQFT, 
bldgarea_1, 
area
a
 
. Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: catotal_1 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
d
i
m
e
n
s
i
o
n
0 
1 .916
a
 .839 .839 2.04814065E4 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Value_SQFT, bldgarea_1, area 
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ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 3.945E12 3 1.315E12 3134.645 .000
a
 
Residual 7.576E11 1806 4.195E8   
Total 4.702E12 1809    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Value_SQFT, bldgarea_1, area 
b. Dependent Variable: catotal_1 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -21829.077 996.353  -21.909 .000   
area 4.719 .089 .764 53.120 .000 .431 2.321 
bldgarea_1 2.675 .237 .158 11.287 .000 .454 2.200 
Value_SQFT 1176.234 98.069 .120 11.994 .000 .890 1.124 
a. Dependent Variable: catotal_1 
 
 
Collinearity Diagnostics
a
 
Model Dimension 
Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) area bldgarea_1 Value_SQFT 
d
i
m
e
n
s
i
o
n
0 
1 
dimension1 
1 2.925 1.000 .02 .03 .02 .02 
2 .730 2.001 .07 .11 .10 .10 
3 .233 3.540 .17 .47 .40 .17 
4 .112 5.116 .74 .40 .48 .71 
a. Dependent Variable: catotal_1 
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2000 Parcels 
 
Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
d
i
m
e
n
s
i
o
n
0 
1 Value_SQFT, 
area, bldgarea
a
 
. Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: catotal 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
d
i
m
e
n
s
i
o
n
0 
1 .874
a
 .763 .763 1.61987838E4 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Value_SQFT, area, bldgarea 
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ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1.384E12 3 4.612E11 1757.617 .000
a
 
Residual 4.293E11 1636 2.624E8   
Total 1.813E12 1639    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Value_SQFT, area, bldgarea 
b. Dependent Variable: catotal 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -21697.632 855.736  -25.356 .000   
area 3.246 .090 .569 36.058 .000 .581 1.722 
bldgarea 4.066 .253 .255 16.097 .000 .578 1.729 
Value_SQFT 1609.522 49.504 .410 32.513 .000 .910 1.099 
a. Dependent Variable: catotal 
 
 
 
Collinearity Diagnostics
a
 
Model Dimension 
Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) area bldgarea Value_SQFT 
d
i
m
e
n
s
i
o
n
0 
1 
dimension1 
1 3.078 1.000 .02 .03 .02 .02 
2 .564 2.337 .04 .11 .13 .24 
3 .239 3.589 .20 .61 .26 .12 
4 .120 5.072 .74 .26 .58 .62 
a. Dependent Variable: catotal 
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2005 parcels 
 
Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
d
i
m
e
n
s
i
o
n
0 
1 ave_sqft, area, 
bldgarea
a
 
. Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: catotal 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
d
i
m
e
n
s
i
o
n
0 
1 .795
a
 .631 .631 29692.012 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ave_sqft, area, bldgarea 
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ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2.670E12 3 8.901E11 1009.664 .000
a
 
Residual 1.559E12 1768 8.816E8   
Total 4.229E12 1771    
a. Predictors: (Constant), ave_sqft, area, bldgarea 
b. Dependent Variable: catotal 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -9583.553 1274.162  -7.521 .000   
area .892 .138 .149 6.480 .000 .395 2.529 
bldgarea 4.068 .321 .293 12.667 .000 .390 2.564 
ave_sqft 1741.591 36.584 .707 47.605 .000 .946 1.057 
a. Dependent Variable: catotal 
 
 
Collinearity Diagnostics
a
 
Model Dimension 
Eigenvalue Condition Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) area bldgarea ave_sqft 
d
i
m
e
n
s
i
o
n
0 
1 
d i mensi on1 
1 2.789 1.000 .03 .03 .02 .03 
2 .860 1.801 .06 .06 .09 .16 
3 .212 3.625 .67 .24 .08 .48 
4 .139 4.474 .25 .67 .81 .33 
a. Dependent Variable: catotal 
 
 
 
